

The Estonian Higher Military School (1921–1940): Some Methodical Aspects in the Development of Small Nation's Higher Military Education¹

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This article will attempt to describe some basic features of the Military Academy's (Staff College) establishment and development in the period between the world wars in the Republic of Estonia. An examination of the Estonian Higher Military School's development helps one discover some of the basic concepts of the Estonian military doctrine and orientation of the period. The level of training of the pre-World War II Estonian defence forces is often evaluated as high or even outstanding, but there still remains a lack of detailed study of the training system. This article aims to fill some of the gap and focuses on the curriculum and the educational methods of the established staff course. The question of how a staff officer was defined under Estonian conditions in the pre-World War II period is also examined.

After the first years of development, the former Russian school of military education was found to be too theoretical. The need for practical work methods was consistently stressed in the early years of the Estonian Republic's school. However, as it is been noted in one general study of military education, the tensions between theory and practice create ambiguities that were part of the military education of the period on question and which remain unresolved today.² These tensions were quite evident in the armed forces of the Republic of Estonia in the period between the world wars.

The Military Academy of the Republic of Estonia was established as a separate training unit – the General Staff Course Unit – on the 12th September 1921. On the 1st October 1923, the courses, together with the Military School and Non-Commissioned Officers School were incorporated into the Estonian Military Educational Institution (in Estonian *Sojaväe Ühendatud Oppeasutused*). Since then, the Chief of the General Staff Course was also the Commandant of the Estonian Military

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Educational Institution (after 1937 a separate leader was appointed for the Higher Military School under the command of the above named larger training formation leader). The purpose of combining the different institutions that provided military training was to put them under a unified authority and thereby ensure common objectives for the training process at all levels. The measure was also intended to cut personnel and administrative costs of each training unit. On the 1st. August 1925, the General Staff Course Unit was named the Higher Military School (in Estonian: *Korgem Sojakool*).

1. Some comparisons with neighbours

The rapid organisation of general staff officer courses in Estonia was made possible by the previous experiences of the War of Independence (1918–1920), and by the common view shared by senior military leaders in Estonia as to dealing with military personnel issues. Although there were 17 to 18 officers of Estonian descent in Russian service in the end of 1917 who had graduated from the Russian Nicholas General Staff Academies peacetime or wartime courses, only seven of these officers participated in the formation and command of the Estonian armed forces in the War of Independence (Kröönstöm, 2008:57). Therefore, by general consent, it was deemed absolutely necessary for a small nation to have well-prepared armed forces and highly qualified leaders³ in order to provide a successful resistance against a larger military force that they would be likely to face in any future conflicts. The fact that the Estonian military leaders had a common (former Russian) military training also contributed to agreement on a process that allowed the use of former teaching staff officers of Russian academies who lived in Estonia at that time on the faculty of the Republic's officer schools. Probably the best-known of them was the former Russian General-Lieutenant and military historian Alexey Baiov (1871–1935). As a consequence, the rapid launch of higher military education in Estonia made it possible to start the development of operational and tactical solutions that fit Estonia's local situation and took into account the recent war experience. The conditions noted above made it possible for Estonia to be the first of the former Russian border states to establish a military staff college. (Korgem Sojakool, 1931)⁴

In Finland the Higher Military School (in Finnish: *Sotakorkeakoulu*) was founded in 1924. In Finland, the initial concept was to educate staff officers in necessary numbers in abroad. The establishment of the Staff

College was also hindered by dissensions between two parties in officer corps --between the Russian school officers and those who served as volunteers in German Army in the World War. The “Russians” tended more towards studies in abroad, but they were forced out of key positions soon by the “Jaeger officers”. When the Finnish staff college was established the first lecturers of the main military subjects were hired from Sweden and some other European countries. (Kempfi, 2006:170-172)

In Latvia a Staff College was founded in 1924⁵ as the Military Academic Courses (in Latvian: *Kara Akademiskie kursi*). Together with Military Polytechnic Courses (founded in 1922) they were united institutionally in 1928 as an independent course under the name – Senior Officer Courses (*Vīrsnieku Augstakie kursi*). In 1935, according to the approved law, the organization of the military educational facilities structure was changed. Henceforth, both of the above mentioned courses functioned as a general and special departments of the Higher Military School (*Augstākā kara skola*). Initially, the course followed the example of Russian and French organized training. However, the course program was adapted to the local tactical conditions under the leadership of General Hugo Rozensteins (1892–1941) in the second half of the 1930s. Other Latvian officers were also seconded for staff education to French, Polish, Czechoslovakian and to other national staff colleges. (Anderson, 1983:189-191)

The Lithuanian Higher Military School (named for Vytautas the Great—in Lithuanian *Vytauto Didžiojo aukštąja karo mokykla*) was founded in 1931. Up to that time the Lithuanian officers were seconded for staff education to the appropriate academies of France, Belgium and Czechoslovakia. (Zebrauskaite-Yepishkiniene, 2000:15; data from *Sodur*, 1934:697)

In Poland the military staff college was founded in 1919 with the assistance of the French military mission. It was named as the Higher Military School (in Polish: *Wyższa Szkoła Wojskowa*) soon after the end of Polish–Soviet war in 1922. The Polish Military Academy was established and influenced from the start by the French army. (Wikipedia.org; Kiesling, 1998:55)

From the early 1920s onwards, the training of staff-officers in Estonia was based on the principle that officers received their higher education in their home country, and after that some would have the opportunity for additional training in relevant educational institutions abroad, mostly in France. The first Estonian commandant – Colonel (later General-

Lieutenant Nikolai Reek, 1890–1942) and first director of the General Staff Course 1921–1923) was admitted to the French Higher Military School (in French *Ecole Supérieure de Guerre*) course in 1923. Reek had been a graduate of the Russian General Staff Academy's abbreviated wartime course. The pattern chosen by Estonia was based on the concept that officers should first get to know the situation and respective tactics of his home country and, after that, his knowledge could be supplemented by relevant training abroad.

During this period, almost 30 Estonian officers received their higher military training in military institutions of higher education abroad (at least fifteen in France, five in Finland, four in Poland, two in Latvia, one in Belgium and one in Germany). Based on mutual agreement, students were exchanged with institutions in neighbouring countries like Finland and Latvia. Three Finnish and three Latvian officers graduated the Estonian Higher Military School course during the interwar period. In addition, during that period, two-way visits and study trips were arranged with military academy students in Finland, Latvia and Poland. In the summers of 1932 and 1933 the Estonian and Latvian Higher Military Schools worked together in conducting a joint staff ride exercise in the territory of both countries. In the 1930s, compared with other small countries in the region, the qualification of leaders with a higher military education in Estonia was considered to be advanced. Even in periods of economic hardship, the government never considered suspending the activities of the Academy.

2. The purpose of the institution

The mission of the Military Academy was first articulated in temporary statutes with the establishment of the General Staff Course Unit in 1921⁶: to prepare officers for junior general staff officer posts and provide additional military training for commanders of military units. In addition, the course was designed to broaden the horizons of the participants in military matters, attract greater interest and devotion to the science of war and provide students with methods of scientific research in military subject areas. The mission of the Military Academy was set out for the second time, in the Law of the Military Academy approved by the Government of the Republic of Estonia in 1931⁷. The law stipulates that officers are to be provided with military higher education, especially directed towards the formation and command of the armed forces, as well as to doing scientific

research and implementing possible outcomes, in subject areas related to national defence. The overall aim of military higher education is to synthesize, develop and implement leadership and working methods (doctrine) among Estonian officers in fitting with the special Estonian situation. The ultimate aim of the military higher education is to provide all officers filling both wartime and peacetime posts of battalion commanders or above with a unified military higher education in the Military Academy. The study process was designed to prepare leaders with the ability to think and work independently.

3. The curriculum development

The curricula of the Military Academy subdivided the 2-year study period into two courses. For those entering the academy with entrance tests, a 4-month period was added to the two years for writing their final papers. From the year 1938, the course was transformed into a 3-year course. Both academic years were in turn subdivided into summer and winter courses. The aim of the summer course was to teach practical skills and it included various practical tasks. The winter course, on the other hand was more encyclopaedic-theoretical, involving more theoretical lectures in the classroom. In this respect, substantial changes were made during the study of the 3rd course (1926–27). The changes were introduced following the pattern of the French Military Higher School (*Ecole Supérieure de Guerre*), and were initiated by officers who had studied there, led by Colonel (late General-Lieutenant) Nikolai Reek who was promoted to the post of Chief of General Staff in 1925. A year after General Reek presented the plan of reorganization of the Staff Course under the example of the French experiences to the Minister of War. The plan was approved though it met some hot discussion and resistance from the representatives of old school. The reforms introduced in field of military education in 1926 were described by contemporaries as the breakpoint in change of orientation in military education from former Russian ideas towards European thinking. The previous system based on repetition was replaced by a new system with greater emphasis on independent work. The number of class lectures was reduced considerably which enabled more time for independent works and solutions. Instead of unconnected lectures and information the work methods were considered to be more important for raising the staff officers who are able to think and work independently. All military subjects had support the principal subject – the general tactics. From now on

instead of examinations the students had to be evaluated only under their independent practical works.

The study of the War of Independence (1918–1920) was included to the curriculum as a means of teaching leaders how to think and operate in the local environment (theatre of war and human resources). Colonel Reek also stressed the importance of closer study of the Soviet Russian military organization, doctrine and tactical developments. As a result of the reorganization of the study process in the years of 1927–1928 the general number of theoretical class lessons was reduced by 1/3.⁸ The class lessons in tactics and staff service of second class (1923–1926) were reduced almost by half in comparison with the fourth class course (1927–1930) (from 571 lessons to 230) and respectively even up to quarter size to that of previous number in art of war and history of war (from 205 lessons to 52). The change of study methods decreased average number of lessons per day from first class (1921–1923) 6,2 work hours to that of 4,5 in the sixth class (1931–1933). Starting from the sixth class (1931) the whole detailed 2-year curriculum in paper could be distributed to the students from the start of the study course. According to the curriculum of the seventh class (1934–1936) in both winter years in tactics practical map exercises were solved, also one two-sided war-game was played. During the summer course under the study of tactics one 2–3 week long field ride was organized, during which the terrain exercises were solved for teaching assessment of landscape character especially in border areas. Tactical exercises were solved both in map and terrain at the limits of battalion and regiment in first year and in the limits of brigade and division size units in the second year.

The subjects taught were subdivided into the principal groups (tactics, strategy, staff procedures and war history) and supporting groups (communications, war gas, fortification, naval warfare, special services, military topography, political history, constitutional law, international law, criminal law applicable to armed conflict, economy, statistics, military psychology, sociology, meteorology and languages: Estonian, German, French, English and Russian), as was stipulated in the Law of the Military Academy of 1931. In the autumn of 1938 several new subjects were included to the curriculum as national defence and war leadership, Estonian history in the early middle age, military administration, economic mobilisation, civil defence (aerial and gas defence), public economy and state administration, national treasury and practical shooting. This caused

the whole study course extension to three years; however the existing work organization was not changed.

In the war economics specialty opened in the Military Academy in the year 1934, the volume of tactical subjects was smaller than in leadership and staff procedures specialties, or rather a more specific approach was adopted. As an example, subjects like logistic support in wartime (supply tactics) and administration of the defence forces were included in the curriculum. Also, in the specialty of economics, the volume of military subjects was smaller. Instead subjects like chemistry, food, leather, wood and metal technologies, bread baking, soap making, care of soldiers, commercial law, civil law, labour law, agriculture, economic geography and accounting were taught. The study process in the Military Academy was arranged so that about 70% of all subjects in the curriculum were common for both study branches, and 30% of the subjects were taught separately to both specialty groups. Rannamets, 2003:38)

4. Development of the study methods

In the initial years of the staff course teaching methods were dominated by theoretical class lectures. The temporary statute of the course constituted that the teaching is organized under the repetition system. With the reforms of 1927–1928 the repetitions were replaced completely with the student's independent works. Practical leadership exercises were introduced in maps and terrain together with corresponding class and homework. The lectures were now used in field of tactics only for introduction as an assistant method. The amount of practical leadership exercises rose for example in comparison with the second class (1923–1926) 39% to that of 81% in the fifth class (1929–1931). The study process was reorganized under the practical work method. The foundations of the leadership exercises were changed with the reform of 1927–1928. Earlier the students were divided for tactical exercises to groups (10 pupils in each) under the supervision of group leaders, but as these worked separately and reached different final solutions it resulted in a lack of integrity. Now the exercises were carried out under the leadership of the senior leader. The solutions were discussed with the group leaders and the so-called school solution was framed. The general leader of tactical studies delivered the introductory lectures on which the tactical situation was created. The situation was then discussed in the groups. Under the school solution the exercises were based on maps and led by the group leaders.

During the winter the exercise was conducted indoors, but in summer it was carried out as a field ride. After discussions in the groups the students had to present their individual solutions in the form of written decisions. The student's individual work was first critiqued by the group leaders. Then a general discussion was carried out by all groups under the leadership of the senior leader, who criticised student reports anonymously and also announced the school solution. The aim of the school solution was to create a set of unified leadership principles (leadership doctrine). However, an effort had to be made to avoid stereotypes in the solution and allow space for critical thinking. After the general discussion with all students, individual discussions with each student were held by the instructors.

Two important methodical manuals were compiled under the guidance of General Reek. First of them was written by Reek himself for facilitating practical works in tactics under the title "*The Leaders Decision and its development*" (1927, updated version in 1937). The booklet was a review of tactical problems and their methodical handling manual, compiled of the principles from newer Belgian, French and German instructions and manuals. For introduction of the French case study methods (in French *cas concrets*) in tactics the French Higher Military School lecturer's manual was translated into Estonian in following year (Gerin, 1928). The Reek's booklet remained for the rest of the period as the basis for exercises in tactical field. According to this manual the military situation had to be evaluated from the point of own and enemy forces, the character of terrain, time and weather factor had to be taken into account. Analysis of the mentioned elements had to form the basis for leaders decision, which had to express shortly and clearly the aim of the planned manoeuvre.

In addition to tactical works the individual written class and amount of homework assignments grew steadily in other subjects (military history, languages etc). For instance, up to 1936 the military history was taught mostly in lectures. After 1936 the main stress was given to the individual student surveys and presentations. The equalization of the officers' intellectual level enabled in the second half of the 1930ies to put the main emphasis in the study process to the principle of individual work. The purpose was also to expand the officer's ability to work independently and to prepare him to compose final papers from different sources.

Of all the teaching methods employed, the practical or theoretical student written assignments were most widely used method. An important part of the study process was also field rides and excursions that focused on the employment of various tactics, the use of military topography and an understanding of military history. The study process was completed by the student with the writing and defence of a final paper. Writing the final paper was compulsory for those who passed entrance tests to get to the Academy. For those who were seconded there, the final paper was optional. In instructions for composing of the papers the student's independent responsibility was stressed and no supervision is mentioned in the records. Two judges (a senior and a junior judge) were appointed to review each paper. Only those graduates of the course who presented and defended their final papers were granted final diplomas. These diplomas granted them the right to hold future appointments on the staff that presupposed the higher military education. Thus, the independent written work had to prove the officers suitability for staff service.

The papers on military topics had both theoretical and practical parts. The practical part of the paper addressed the applicability of the theoretical approaches presented in relevant research outcomes to given i.e. Estonian, conditions. In historical topics, a review of the main outcomes related to the art of war was required in addition to the scientific research of a specific subject area. The final papers by the Military Academy graduates that have come down to us are an important source of information for exploring military doctrine and its developments in the Independent Estonian Republic.

According to a report written by Major Nikolai Riiberk (1900–1942), who was the only Estonian who studied at the German General Staff Academy in Berlin (German: *Kriegsakademie*) between 1936–1938 (ERA 650–1–718, 349–351, 379–381), the Estonian Higher Military School was more oriented towards delivering general education in comparison with the German institution. Nevertheless he noted that Estonia and Germany were both inclined towards moving to a more focused and specialized military education. In Germany the practical exercises were the dominant part of the curriculum. As Major Riiberk noted, in comparison with Estonia, the Germans tactics were handled in more formal way and their curriculum focused much more on large formation operations. In Estonia the tactics and operations of brigades⁹ were conducted only on a theoretical basis as there was no such peacetime standing unit in a small country like Estonia

and practically no possibilities to train leaders in this level of command. These conditions raised the question about the practical applicability of brigade level training in wartime.

5. The teaching staff

From the first years of its existence there were limits imposed on the study process in the Academy by the use of temporary teaching staff. In 1922, the permanent post of a professor was created in the Military Academy. Yet, in 1927 this post was eliminated from the structure of the academy. During the reorganization of the foundations of the study process in 1926–1927 most of the teaching staff-officers of Russian origin or with training received in Russia – were replaced by younger Estonian personnel (graduates from the first courses of the Academy). The positions of permanent lecturers were established as late as in the academic year of 1936–37. However, the number of permanent posts for teaching staff also remained relatively small afterwards. Military subjects, especially tactical subjects, were taught both by permanent teaching staff and by inspectors of the branches of the armed forces, chiefs of military districts and other specialists. Civilian subjects were also taught by several Tartu University professors.

6. The graduates

During the period from 1921 to 1940, officers graduated from the Academy in the leadership and staff procedures specialty course in nine year groups, and in the war the economy specialty consisted of two year groups. A total of 232 officers graduated, among them 3 officers from the Finnish and 3 officers from the Latvian Defence Forces.

Each year at graduation there were some experienced officers seconded to the Academy as well as junior officers who had passed the entrance tests. The exception is the last, 9th course (1938-40) – where all the officers admitted to that course had taken the entrance tests. From the 6th course onwards (in 1931) those officers who were seconded to the Academy also had to take entrance tests. The experienced officers seconded to the Academy made up from one sixth to more than half of all students. In the 1930s, on average, there were three candidates per one student place. During that period of time, about 70% of all graduates of the Academy

were those who had entered through entrance tests, while the rest of the graduates were senior officers (starting from the rank of major).

Based on current knowledge, out of the 226 officers who graduated from the Academy (not considering the three Finnish and three Latvian officers), few of the more than 100 officers (a little less than 50% of all officers) had received some sort of military training before entering the Academy in other lower institutions of military education in Estonia such as the Military School and Military Technical School. More than half (60%) of the students who took entrance tests were the graduates of other military schools throughout Estonia. The rest of the students were the graduates of different military schools in Russia. However, the majority of them had been to the ensign courses during World War I (i.e. received short-term wartime officer training), followed by peacetime training offered by the Estonian Military School, and after that by the one-year in-service officer training courses designed for officers in active service organised by the Estonian Military Educational Institution.

By the time of Estonia's occupation in 1940, there were almost 220 officers who were graduates of the Estonian Military Academy in active service. As many as 50 of them were killed by the Soviet authorities, mostly during the period from 1941 to 1942 in the territories of Estonia or the Soviet Union. Several Estonian officers who were graduates of the Academy were killed or repressed by the Soviet authorities after the second occupation of Estonia by the Soviet Union (1944). Another 50 graduates of the Academy perished in concentration camps in the Soviet Union. Consequently, around 100 graduates of the Academy (i.e. 45% of all graduates in the active service as of the year 1940) can be regarded as direct victims of the Soviet authorities. Although in 1940, the majority of the Academy graduates who were in the service that time were incorporated in the Red Army (the 22nd Rifle Corps), by the year 1944, there were only 30 of them left in the active service in the Red Army (i.e. 13–14% of all Estonian officers who had graduated from the Academy). At least 65 graduates of the Academy were members of various German military and police units and services formed in Estonia (in all almost 30% of the Academy graduates who were in the active service in the year 1940). Most of them had fled the Red Army in 1941 or were taken prisoners by the Germans.

The two Finnish officers who graduated from the Academy served in 1944, one as a regiment commander and the other as a battalion commander of the Infantry Regiment No 200, a unit in the Finnish Army made up mostly of Estonian volunteers. About ten graduates of the Estonian Military Academy were killed in combat in World War II. Some officer-graduates also died during evacuation or of combat-related incidents. (Estonian National Defence College Proceedings Series, 9/2008:60-70)¹⁰

Conclusion

We can probably safely assume that Estonia is one of the smallest nations ever to have had a higher military educational system (staff education) in its own language. As the former Russian military education was considered to be too theoretical, soon after the first years of the General Staff Courses the significant changes were introduced in methodology and a curriculum on the French model was created and initiated in 1927. During this relatively short period an interesting transformation was achieved starting with the development of the old Russian system and moving towards a European oriented system. The Estonians established their unique education system that considered its own conditions and possibilities. The last mentioned moment was stressed often by the contemporaries.

From the start the far-sighted decisions were made that forced the whole officer corps to promote self-education for acceptance to the Higher Military School course, which served as the only firm guarantee for advancing one's military career. In comparison with the great powers the educational level of the Military Academy education was brought to bear on much lower levels of command. There was an idea that all peacetime and wartime battalion commanders (besides higher level staffs personnel) should have unified higher military preparation.

In the initial years of the Estonian Army the general and military educational background of the Estonian officers was very diverse and sometimes quite low. This left its imprint on the course in general and hindered the attempt to set proper academic standards. However, the improvement in the quality of the students and the more even level of education in the graduates is seen by the beginning of 1930s when the recently commissioned subalterns dominated the class composition of the course participants. This improvement in educational background and

preparation enabled the course to change the nature of the study process. Independent work methods became the dominant methodology—and this also reflected the ideal, which was to raise the officer's unified skills and his ability to think and work independently in local conditions. Although the conditions and means of warfare have greatly changed over the decades, the developments made in Estonia in this period --especially in field of study, work methods and organization – provides some thought provoking material even today.

The training and education of military personnel is a long process. According to some estimates, the period of time needed to prepare a competent officer-leader corps for an army is about 25 years. The Estonian Republic had almost sufficient time between the World Wars to prepare its officer corps. However, in losing its national independence and as a result of the turmoil that followed, Estonia's military was destroyed and the promise went unrealized.

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¹ An earlier extended version of this paper appeared in Estonian (with English Summary) in the *Estonian National Defence College Proceedings Series* issue No 9/2008 (KVÜÕA Toimetised 9/2008).

² See Hattendorf, John B. The Conundrum of Military Education in Historical Perspective, in G. C. Kennedy and K. Neilson (ed.), 2002. *Military Education: Past, Present, and Future*. Westport, Connecticut London: Praeger. p. 3.

³ The maxim – „*the smaller the army the better its leaders should be*“ was borrowed from Germans and stressed by General Nikolai Reek in some of his writings in the 1920ies. (in German: “*Je kleiner das Heer, desto tüchtiger müssen seine Führer sein*”). The impact of Weimar Germany’s influence on Estonian military training is not studied. However there can be noticed some similarities in numbers. With the treaty of Versailles the Germany could have 100000 men peacetime army with 4000 officers. In Estonia almost the same number of forces was considered to be possible to gather in case of total mobilization. These parallels had to be mentioned by the contemporaries in Estonia and offer some interest especially in field of training.

As much as it is possible to distinguish the overall military or leadership doctrine in Estonia it could be defined as “*quality instead of numbers*”. It meant that in Estonian situation against possible war with enemy with overwhelming human and technical resources it was possible only by relying upon superbly trained military

forces.

⁴ The establishment of the Polish staff college as compared here with Estonia remains disputable. It is interesting that in Estonian General Staff Courses foundation (1921) there was some hope among army leadership that a group of Latvian and Lithuanian officers would also participate. There were some considerations, or hopes, that some Finnish and Polish officers will participate (although the Polish situation in question was considered as much better). It became obvious however that in case of participation of Poles and Finns some of the former Russian generals and academy professors declared their refusal of work as lecturers in course. (ERA [*Estonian State Archive*] 1856/1/5).

⁵ As in case of Finland there was probably some lack of unity perceptible in the Latvian officer corps in 1920s. According to Estonian General Staff report from the February 1922 there was quite abnormal situation in Latvian officer corps because of existing rivalling parties – The former Latvian Riflemen; Northern Latvians (the Latvian units which were organized under the Estonian command in 1919); Southern Latvians (the Latvian units under the Landeswehr and General von der Goltz in 1919 – Colonel Balodis units), the „Siberians“ (those who served in White Russian Admiral Kotshak’s forces). As it is expressed in the given report, the tensions between the parties tended to intensify not lessen. (ERA [*Estonian State Archive*] 527/1/1471. p. 32).

⁶ Command of the day of the Minister of War No. 433 from July 18th, 1921.

⁷ Decree of Higher Military School given by the Government of the Republic of Estonia on July 29th 1931.

⁸ Numerical data here and later taken mostly from the ahead mentioned issue: Korgem Sojakool, 1931.

⁹ Between 1928–1940 the Estonian army organization consisted of 3 divisional commands and staffs (4th division was formed in 1939). For every division there were established territorial defence districts. As the operational units of the divisions in wartime it was expected that the army would form 6 brigade leaderships (staffs). It was planned that every brigade will consist of 2–3 infantry regiments, of 2 lighter and of 1 heavier battery groups and a reconnaissance squadron. In case of necessity other arms units had to be included.

¹⁰ All data presented in this section is gathered by the author from several sources and is properly cited in the *Estonian National Defence College Proceedings Series*, issue No 9/2008 (KVÜÕA Toimetised 9/2008) Pp. 60–70.