

Proceedings of a Workshop on NATO's Strategic Concept, 15-16 October 2009

By Baltic Defence College faculty

These proceedings provide a summary of the highlights of a workshop that took place 15-16 October 2009 at the Baltic Defence College that covered the upcoming NATO Strategic Concept discussions. The workshop brought together panellists and analysts from all three Baltic States, as well as external experts. The workshop discussions were conducted under Chatham House rules so that there could be a candid discussion on the preferred way ahead for developing the new strategic concept from the perspective of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. This document is meant to provide an indication of Baltic nation aspirations and intentions. They do not represent the totality of the discussions that took place.

The first such statement was found in the participants' packets and consisted of a Latvian essay which was being distributed simultaneously in Strasbourg at the meeting of the NATO Secretary General's panel of "wise persons" who are charged with conducting discussions on the new Strategic Concept for the Alliance. It served as an excellent basis for discussion, as the Latvian strategic challenges are not far removed from that of Estonia or Lithuania.

1. Latvian Essay on NATO's Fundamental Security Tasks

A summary:

NATO's New Strategic Concept should serve the following key objectives:

- keep collective defence as the core function of the Alliance;
- strengthen NATO's political cohesion and solidarity;
- maintain NATO as the primary forum for transatlantic security dialogue;
- sustain NATO's military capabilities to guarantee the security of all of its members through credible deterrence and collective defence;
- provide equal security for all allies.

1.1. Core Tasks of the Alliance

The core tasks of the 1999 Strategic Concept - security, consultation, deterrence and defence - remain valid.

Article 5 is the core principle of the Alliance: it expresses the political commitment and solidarity of the members of the Alliance to act together in the interest of all members of the Alliance with respect to possible threats and challenges. Those threats and challenges will vary from the traditional to the non-traditional that will mandate appropriate responses by the Alliance in the given circumstances and include both political and military tools.

The Alliance has an obligation to continue its military transformation efforts, all the while ensuring that its military deterrence is retained, and that its forces are flexible and adaptable enough to operate across the full spectrum of operations and missions, including on the territory of the Alliance. These capabilities will allow the Alliance to respond quickly to a variety of unexpected security threats arising in the future that threaten the interests of member states and their populations.

In this context, the visibility of Article 5 in all the member states is of paramount importance, as the credibility of the Alliance's commitment to its core business is the *sine non qua* in order to preserve support for the Alliance in our population. Practical steps that would demonstrate the readiness of the Alliance to implement collective defence would give credibly to its commitment of mutual defence. Such steps should include the employment and demonstration of NATO capabilities by ensuring adequate planning, exercises and training, as agreed at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit.

Nuclear deterrence, including the United States nuclear foot-print, remains an indispensable part of overall Alliance deterrence.

1.2. The changing Security Environment: its impact on NATO's enduring purpose

Safeguarding the freedom and security of NATO members should remain the core function of the Alliance.

The security environment that the Alliance will have to deal with in the future will be unpredictable and complex. Threats and challenges could range from the traditional to the non-traditional. In this context, the Alliance will have to:

- 1) preserve credible military capabilities and arrangements relevant to traditional threats;
- 2) work on strengthening adequate capabilities addressing threats from terrorism, cyber attacks, and proliferation of WMD;
- 3) cooperate with other international actors with respect to constantly evolving security challenges arising from climate change, failed states, piracy and growing competition for energy resources and transit routes;
- 4) respond rapidly and effectively in response to an unpredictable strategic environment, which will necessitate internal reforms of the Alliance's structures and processes to strengthen decision-making.

The key to a successful and effective way of implementing above mentioned is a single, adaptive and responsive decision making mechanism and adequate structure capability to cope with the tasks of the Alliance.

The new Strategic Concept should be based on a common perception of security. But, it is clear that NATO will not be able to respond to all conceivable threats and challenges and, therefore, it is important that a common understanding among allies on the main priorities be reached and serve as a basis for the development of an integrated set of capabilities.

The Alliance must have the ability to respond to global threats wherever they may arise. Response to out of area threats and challenges will have to be determined on the basis of the severity of the threat to the security of Alliance.

1.3. NATO's political role

NATO's political role can be enhanced by a continuous strategic discussion about security challenges within the Alliance, as well as with international actors, first and foremost the EU and the UN.

The consensus principle has been the mainstay of Alliance solidarity that prompts member states to engage in a continuous dialogue and consultation with each other on questions vital to their security. In an unpredictable security environment, such consultations will have to be

based on extensive information sharing and evaluation. The transatlantic link will be indispensable in any priority setting exercise. While the NAC is the principal venue for this discussion, there needs to be a strong link back to capitals that engages the appropriate officials. Moreover, Ministerials and HoSG meetings will need to address strategic issues in addition to operational issues and may necessitate more frequent meetings.

Given that the threats and challenges that the Alliance faces will not be limited in scope but could occur anywhere, a strategic dialogue with other international actors will increasingly become a necessity that the Alliance cannot forego.

1.4. NATO's strategy for the early 21st century

Allies should set clear priorities and clarify what the Alliance is ready to do as its primary task and where it will play a supporting role (using one set of forces).

It has been generally recognized that the Alliance is the foremost hard security provider. In the last analysis it should play to its strength, though without neglecting improvement in its civilian or soft security capabilities. Soft security should be developed through advancing NATO's civil-military joint planning and co-operation, building capabilities to respond to emerging threats in cooperation with partners and international actors with more advanced soft security tools. Shaping events rather than reacting to events can be a strategic direction for the Alliance as it adjusts to the economic downturn. At the same time, the Alliance will have to continue to balance its capabilities and not focus exclusively on requirements for current operations. NATO has to be ready to prove that it can protect its own populations and maintain a credible deterrence.

The workshop opened with a statement by Brigadier General Gundars Abols (Latvian Army), Commandant of the Baltic Defence College, who then yielded the floor to Mr. Imants Liegis, Minister of Defence of Latvia. His remarks are transcribed here, and they reflect the challenges alluded to in the Latvian essay. The Minister gave a speech that set the appropriate academic tone for the discussions that were to follow.

Mr. Liegis started by saying that the NATO Strategic Concept 1999, which is still valid until the elaboration of a new one in May 2010, coincided with

the creation of the Baltic Defence College that same year. Currently, the review of the BALTDEFCOL and the consultations of a new Strategic Concept also run in parallel.

The Minister then gave highlights of the current process and future concept issues and topics. NATO Secretary General Rasmussen has set a clear path based on the previous summer's decisions (following the conflict between Georgia and Russia), and appointed a panel of advisers (so-called "wise persons") chaired by former U.S. State Secretary Mrs. Madeleine Albright, to provide options to the Secretary General in May 2010.

Those options will go back to the nations through the North Atlantic Council and from those consultations the actual document will eventually be formulated. It is the first time that the three Baltic States are present for the formulation of a new Strategic Concept, and Central and Eastern Europe is well represented by a Polish representative, and the Baltic States in particular are represented by a Latvian representative Ambassador Aivis Ronis. This representation is a testimony of the Alliance's commitment to integration and is a proof of acceptance of its new members. There are no military representative in the group of wise persons because of the principle of civil control over the military is a key element of NATO's philosophy.

Regarding issues, the Minister stated that the current Strategic Concept discussions made particular emphasis on the importance of NGOs and non-state (or at least non-traditional) actors. In this sense, the BALTDEFCOL has a role to play in the elaboration of the Strategic Concept, and this workshop is a good example of it. The members' interests will play out in the consultations, and will probably affect the outcome significantly.

One format that seems to be generating consensus is that of the four "Rs" elicited by US-based scholar Hans Binnendijk. Binnendijk stressed the content and substance of Responsibility, Reassurance, Resilience and Re-engagement. Some of these terms are instinctive.

Responsibility means the importance of being security providers and contributors to the Alliance. ISAF is a good example where members act

responsibly towards Alliance goals and missions, and this provides the second “R” – Reassurance.

Reassurance is the reason the three Baltic States have sought membership in the Alliance. The principles of article 5 refer to mutual assistance of the members. As the process of consultation for a new Strategic Concept moves forward, the Baltic States will look for the reassurances of collective defense. Another related issue is that of contingency planning. Should it be a part of the Strategic Concept or not? The current Strategic Concept embraces the sanctity of those guarantees. This is why certain members were not keen on a new Strategic Concept.

Reassurance is nothing without Resilience, the third R. The credibility of the Alliance depends on its members not being swayed unduly in the performance of their mission. This “R” acknowledges the existence of non-traditional threats brought about by the new security environment. As far as Baltic States are concerned, interference by third countries in internal affairs is a non-traditional threat. These threats are no less real than piracy and terrorism.

The final “R” causes the most disquiet among the Baltic States. Re-engagement triggers a disparity of opinions which are difficult to reconcile. Re-engagement with Russia cannot be equated with re-engagement with other powers. Secretary-General Rasmussen wants to re-energize the NATO-Russia Council, a body created in 1997, but where real issues have not been discussed in depth. Despite the positive signs of cooperation which do exist with Russia, concerns about the NATO and Russia relationship remain due to the new regional strategic environment created by the Russia-Georgia conflict of August 2008.

The final Strategic Concept document has to be readable to the non-initiated. What kind of product do we want? A document for experts, or a document that can engage our populations? The Alliance must be visible through the new Strategic Concept in each of our countries.

The Minister left the workshop and Dr. Zaneta Ozolina assumed the role of moderator. Dr. Ozolina said that on the “reassurance” issue, there was little to worry about, as there was little talk of dismantling the Alliance. She noted that there was a mention that an updated Strategic Concept had been needed as far back as 2005. It was said that many new members were

afraid that a new Strategic Concept at that juncture would have meant greater fragmentation of the Alliance (those were the days of Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld's comments on "new" and "old" Europe, as well as a great divergence of opinion as to what the threats to the Alliance members really were). Interestingly, the divergence is not necessarily based on geography anymore. On the one hand, the political class seeks to maintain the current Strategic Concept, suggesting it is still relevant, while the academics tend to be pushing for a new concept.

One way of reconciling these competing views, as it was discussed, was to have two sets of documents. One short, concise, but broad in its description of challenges, and another, more administrative, detailed and technical set of documents that would reveal the application of the Concept in its practical expression. A short debate on that topic ensued, and Dr. Ozolina gave the floor to Dr. Kesselring, who has provided the editor with his speaking notes.

2. New Strategic Concept - Contradictions and open questions

Agilolf Kesselring

In medieval times, when a new king came to power, his vassals - dukes, counts and bishops - went to meet him as fast as possible, bringing their diplomas with them. It was the king's duty to renew the rights (*ius regaliae, ius spoliae*), which his predecessors had transferred. For mediaevalists this is a very challenging issue, because frequently those bishops, counts and dukes falsified diplomas in order to expand their rights.¹ Sometimes the process of adopting a new common strategy in NATO seems to bear similarities with this medieval ritual. While adopting a new common strategy for the alliance, there seems to be only a short time-slot, during which influence may be increased. With a new strategy, there will be always winners and losers. For some states, the common strategy will serve better their national interests and for some less. A good strategy though, - like a good medieval king - balances the system and adjusts it to the realities of power in such a way, that the alliance - like the medieval kingdoms of former times - keeps its team spirit up. We can see this function of NATO strategies especially during the Cold War with NATO strategies MC 14/2 and MC 14/3, which can be both interpreted as tools to increase cohesion and transatlantic solidarity in changing political environments.²

The current Strategic Concept from 1999 defines NATO's role as a defense alliance (Art. 5), transatlantic link (Art. 4), crisis management instrument (Art. 7) and catalyst for security cooperation.³ It should be kept in mind, that the 1999 Strategic Concept has been adopted in especially difficult times. While it had been designed for managing the post-Cold War threats in the aftermath of regional instability having led to mass slaughter in Europe, the process had been rolled over by the events in Kosovo and the perceived need to act immediately. We can say that an already existing carefully developed document had to be quickly adjusted to the current crisis situation. Especially the chapter concerning crisis management was adjusted to suit the use of coercive airpower over Yugoslavia.⁴




Chart 1: NATO's Strategic Concept 1999 and its application until 2009

The following events, and there first of all the massive terrorist attacks on the United States in New York and Washington ("9/11") put NATO into a situation, where the assumptions from before 1999 did not anymore match realities. The US, being under a global threat, did not invest too much time with NATO, the instrument designed for peace in stability in Europe. NATO enlargement however quickly proceeded in order to have the back free for countering the new threats and also to reward the loyalty of the so called "new Europe". The so-called "old" Europe looked for new partners in an attempt to build an axis Paris-Berlin-Moscow, which was thought to better serve national interests than going to war in Iraq. Many experts expected that NATO would never become 60 years old. Gerhard Schröder even said that NATO would not anymore be the central link for transatlantic co-operation. It has been this NATO, caught in its own identity crisis, which was not able to respond credibly in the Georgian case. NATO was at this very time expected to lance its new strategic discussion. It was postponed as there was a lack of unity and at this very moment it looked better to have an unclear old strategy than quarrels about a new one.

Let's go briefly through the main open questions or disagreements left over from the Strategic Concept of 1999. I have put them in an order following the - basically unchanged - role of NATO highlighted in the 1999 paper:

- Defence Alliance (Art. 5)
- Transatlantic link (Art. 4) (I think this is the only field, where there is a clear consensus)
- Crisis Management Instrument (Art. 7)
- Catalyst for Security Cooperation (Art. 2)

NATO as a defence alliance

- How far goes our definition of security?
- Do we emphasise on state's sovereignty or security of state's inhabitants?
- What is the area we defend?
- Are terrorism, piracy, and cyber attacks matters of defence or of security cooperation?
- How about energy security? (Riga Summit 2007)

NATO as Crisis management instrument

- How about the relations NATO-UN-OSCE-EU-AU?
- Crisis management - where? (European / global)
- Crisis management vs. power projection

NATO as catalyst of wider security co-operation

- What are the topics? Who are the players?
- Economy?
- Non-proliferation of WMD?
- China rising?
- Stability in Europe - SE-Europe - Caucasus?
- African instability - piracy - migration?

Another question is of course the question of enlargement, towards South East Europe. There are reasons to believe that this issue is already decided upon. Geopolitically we can anyway see a focus of NATO towards the South East - if through enlargement or by other means. What we can clearly see, is a regional focus towards the Southeast - through the Balkan to the Black sea and approaching a region that has been called the "arc of instability". Turkey is a key player in this geopolitical approach. This explains the US pressure concerning Turkey's admission in the EU. This leads to the question, on what the implications are for the Nordic and Baltic area.

The following discussion concentrated on NATO's core task and how to establish a balance between the Alliance's role as defence provider and its role as crisis manager.

The three Baltic States' representatives seemed in agreement that security had to be taken as comprehensive and multilateral. However, upon enlargement in 2004, NATO was not well equipped to realize what Russia meant to the newer members. As the workshop was reminded, the members sign on to a Treaty, not to an Alliance, which means that oversimplification must be avoided. It is not an either/or situation. Both Article 4 and Article 5 are part of the North Atlantic Treaty. The fact that the line dividing the two articles is gray and that both articles are inalienable conditions of the Treaty should bring a measure of reassurance to all members. The focus of the *Organization*, however, remains a factor of disquiet in the Baltic States, as it is difficult to know where the "heart" of

NATO is, in Europe, or in the US? In the end, the new Strategic Concept will likely rebalance the notion that the Alliance is not a global policeman, as this would test NATO's credibility.

3. TO's Relation with Partners - a Nordic Perspective

Agilolf Kesselring

"General von Clausewitz says, strategy is using operations for the object of war. [...] on the other hand, strategy includes the operation's success and is built on it. Vis-à-vis the tactical victory, the imperative of strategy remains silent."
(General Field Marshall Helmuth von Moltke 1800-1891)

By talking about Nordic or Baltic approaches, we have to be aware of the fact, that "Nordic" and "Baltic" are no neutral geographic terms; they imply mental maps. If we look around the Baltic Sea, we understand that all countries are members of the European Union - except Russia (including the enclave of Kaliningrad). While the countries on the Southern coast are - since 2004 - all NATO members, the countries in the North are partners. Formally, Sweden and Finland have basically the same status that Russia has vis-à-vis NATO. They are all members in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).

The crucial difference is that both Sweden and Finland are EU countries and NATO is - like it or not - *the* decisive defence organisation for and in Europe. The New Strategic Concept is therefore going to influence Sweden's and Finland's security.

For both, the Baltic Sea is a vital line of support. Both countries have an Arctic component with indigenous population - the Sami - heavily dependent on the environment in the Arctic.⁵ Russia is the neighbour to the East. Sweden and Finland are engaged in NATO missions abroad, in Kosovo and with ISAF in Afghanistan. But in Finland and Sweden, the Afghanistan commitment is seen rather as a modern way of peacekeeping and not as a defence measure under article 5 of the NATO treaty.⁶ Finland has also been sending fighter aircrafts to Germany for NATO certification in September 2009.⁷ NATO membership remains an open question. The possibility of a future NATO membership option is not rejected, but for

the time being not politically wanted. In Finland, at the next presidential elections in 2012, the NATO question is most likely going to be central to the candidates' political programs. The Finnish people will decide. As for Sweden, it seems that this country is able to wait and see what Finland will be doing. However, it is rather to be expected that both countries will follow in the end the same policy. From the perspective of NATO, the two countries are welcome to join NATO; if they don't, it will be respected - that has both been repeatedly stated.

Russia - on the other hand - is a different partner. In 1997 it became a privileged partner of NATO with the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council. In 1999 disagreement over the NATO campaign in Kosovo have brought difficulties, as NATO moved into former Zones of Russian influence.⁸ Enlargement has been another topic of disagreement - already in 1999 and even more in 2004. Disagreement came up again about the Kosovo question in 2007/2008 and since it has reached a peak in Georgia 2008, the NATO-Russia Council has been "frozen". After US President Obama had pressed already the "reset button", the New NATO General Secretary Rasmussen took up the topic of "A New Beginning" in his first speech on September 18. Some citations from Rasmussen's Russia speech may highlight this issue:⁹

"[...] I believe that of all of NATO's relationships with Partner countries, none holds greater potential than the NATO-Russia relationship."

"[...] the international security environment does not wait for NATO and Russia to sort out their act. Quite simply, NATO-Russia cooperation is not a matter of choice – it is a matter of necessity."

"[...] Our ultimate goal must be a relationship that allows us to pursue common interests even when we disagree in other areas."

"[...] NATO wants Russia to be a real stakeholder in European and international security. We need Russia as a partner in resolving the great issues of our time."

His suggestions can be summed up as follows:¹⁰

- 1) Reinforce practical cooperation NATO-Russia
 - update Joint Action Plan on Terrorism

- preventing proliferation WMD
- common missile defence
- maritime security / piracy
- Afghanistan

2) Rejuvenate the NATO-Russia Council

3) Joint review of the new 21st century security challenges

At the same time Rasmussen made clear that NATO is going to continue its open door policy.

Rasmussen presents himself and NATO as "realist", most notable is the phrase, "NATO-Russia cooperation is not a matter of choice - it is a matter of necessity". He talks about necessity and interests - not about friendship, values or historical moments. In order to put the suggestions of the Secretary General into a strategic context, it might be enlightening to look into a speech by another Dane: Troels Froling, Secretary General of the Danish Atlantic Treaty Association speaking on 19 October 2001 in Helsinki:

...there is in other words always a price and all sides in the present conflict will have to realise this. In an overall strategic perspective one of the winners of the war that started 11 September may turn out to become Russia. USA will have to fight an extended war in Afghanistan, the geography of which makes Russia indispensable to the United States [...] Going in through the three Central Asian republics [Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan A.K.] means moving into Russia's sphere of influence [...]. The USA will most probably also meet Russian demands in an other field: Chechnya [...] A *quid pro quo* from Moscow? Consequences? Well, if Moscow cannot win Chechnya unless it dominates the whole of Caucasus, then Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan will have to be included - back in the USSR?¹¹

Rasmussen's speech from 2009 can be interpreted in terms of the idea of a "price to pay" for the engagement in Afghanistan articulated by Froling in 2001 - only short time after the terrorist attacks of "9/11". The question remains still open, about whom we do talk, if we say "terrorists"? Does common missile defence mean practically "no missile defence" for Eastern Europe? Can it really work in means of psychological warfare to fight the

Taliban, side by side with Russia, the "traditional enemy" of the Afghani people? Does de-freezing the NATO-Russia Council mean that the open door policy is limited to South Eastern Europe? And finally, has NATO met its geopolitical limits on the eastern boarder of the alliance's area?

Afghanistan has become the key issue of NATO in practical terms. Afghanistan dominates all other theatres, risks and problems. For the Western powers, it has become a "question of honour", "prestige" and credibility. We should though keep in mind that Afghanistan is just one theatre of operations or one operation in a grand strategy supposed to counter a mix of threats. "Terrorism" is *one* among these threats. NATO nearly follows - if I may use this historical parallel - Moltke's approach, that operations dominate over strategy. Probably this idea goes too far, but in military history terms, famous examples for prestigious operations, which dominated strategy are Verdun and Stalingrad.

NATO's strategic aim of "a Europe whole and free" might not be brought into congruency with the operational aim in Afghanistan as stepping at least partly back from NATO's "policy of open door" being also an aim on the operational level). Russia's current geo-strategic situation provides it with a key position in this question. It is on NATO's policy makers to set the priorities between concurring tasks.

In other words, in a multipolar world with various threats and risks NATO has to choose which goals are most important and which potential threats are seen as the biggest challenges. Unlike many thought still back in the 1990s, it is not enough to concentrate on the so called "new threats", but also geopolitics still do matter. The New Strategic Concept has to balance those different challenges. NATO member's interests may diverge between countries, perceiving themselves at the different front lines. Today such a frontline can be the centre of New York, the subway in London or Madrid, but also, a merchant ship in front of the Somali coast, the hard drive disk in a banking computer or an outer boarder of the NATO area. The decision on what to focus as an Alliance is however a political one.

The greatest and strategic goal of NATO is peace. Peace needs strength and credibility, but also good will and trust in the dynamic of own values. Peace without freedom and democracy should not be the aim.

The discussions and presentations which followed reflected Dr. Kesselring's concerns. The question of missile defense, of cooperation with central Asian countries, the ignorance of values and norms in the discourse is symptomatic of the fact that Russia is ever more present in the equation. However, necessity should not replace norms in the formulation of the new Strategic Concept.

With that in mind, Baltic representatives were quick to point out that if this was the case, then all the more reason to insist on a "specific" Strategic Concept, outlining concrete steps towards a clear goal. At the same time, this goal must accord itself with some Baltic realities and perceptions, and for this reason, some workshop participants were keen to avoid a Strategic Concept focusing too narrowly on military success in Afghanistan. "Rather, one said, maintain the old Security Concept in place." To state that the new Concept has to reflect flexibility in response and means would be a truism, however, the onus is on having a Concept that is "active" not "reactive".

Conclusion

The workshop on NATO's new Strategic Concept offered an original idea that *two* separate documents should frame a broad conception of security in an active tone. While Russia still looms large in the discourse, the realities of an Alliance that has nearly doubled in size since the Study on Enlargement was published 15 years ago have to be accounted for. A frank description of the security environment in the new Strategic Concept is inevitable for finding consensus in the evaluation of evolving threats and challenges. While consolidating NATO's role in the field of non-traditional and asymmetrical challenges, a realistic assessment of conventional threats is still relevant. The use of military forces and regional conflicts still continue to have direct or indirect consequences for the security of the Allies.

This does not mean, however, that the values debate should be ignored. After all, it was said, the Alliance must stand *for* something, as well as defend *against* many threats. The non-traditional character of these threats forces a modicum of flexibility on the Alliance conception of security. This flexibility should answer the notion of complementarity between

international institutions. In other words, there is no division of labour between an EU that deals with soft security issues, and a NATO that deals with purely military challenges. The symbiosis of those roles must also be presented clearly to the constituents of the Alliance.

¹ Wolfgang Petke, *Spolienrecht und Regalienrecht im hohen Mittelalter und ihre rechtlichen Grundlagen* - Von Schwaben bis Jerusalem. Facetten staufischer Geschichte, Sigmaringen 1995,. Ed. Sönke Lorenz & Ulrich Schmitt, 15-36.

² Agilolf Kesselring, "60 Jahre NATO: Wechselnde Bedrohungen - neue Strategien", *Militärgeschichte. Zeitschrift für historische Bildung* (1/2009), 4-7.

³ *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D. C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999.

⁴ Agilolf Kesselring, *NATO - Towards a New Strategic Concept 2010*, National Defence University, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, Series 4, WP No. 33 (Helsinki 2009), 2-3.

⁵ Jeper Hansen, *The Arctic is an Area of Peace*, Arctic Council, 7.10.2009 [<http://arctic-council.org/article/2009/10/the-arctic-is-an-area-of-peace/> 15.11.2009].

⁶ Jyri Raitasalo, (Why on earth) should small states do expeditionary operations? - *Crisis Management in Crisis*, Ed. Susanna Eskola, National Defence University, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, Series 2, Research Reports No. 40. Helsinki 2008, 87-103.

⁷ Ilmavoimat, *Ilmavoimien kansainvälinen toiminta* [<http://www.ilmavoimat.fi/index.php?id=69> / 15.11.2009].

⁸ Agilolf Kesselring, *NATO - Towards a New Strategic Concept 2010*, National Defence University, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, Series 4, WP No. 33 (Helsinki 2009), 15-17.

⁹ Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO and Russia: A New Beginning, Speech by NATO Secretary General at the Carnegie Endowment, Brussels, 18.9.2009. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_57640.htm / 15.11.2009].

¹⁰ Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO and Russia: A New Beginning, Speech by NATO Secretary General at the Carnegie Endowment, Brussels, 18.9.2009. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_57640.htm / 15.11.2009].

¹¹ Troels Frøling, The Security Impact of NATO Enlargement for the Baltic Sea Region - A Danish Perspective. - *Baltic Security, NATO and the EU*, Ed. Karoliina Honkanen & Thomas Ries, The Atlantic Council of Finland, Helsinki 2001, p.34.