War of Memories: Explaining “Memorials War” in Estonia

By Heiko Pääbo *

The events of April 2007 brought Estonia and Tallinn to the headlines of the international press. A country that was considered as a transition miracle and had the image of a peaceful Nordic country was suddenly reported as a battlefield of ethnic tensions. The centre of the capital, Tallinn, was bust up within one night and the Estonian government had to engage volunteers to help police suppress the riots in Tallinn and North-East Estonia. All Estonian society was shocked and it paralysed the communication between Estonian and Russian-speaking communities in Estonia. In addition to domestic developments, the Russian government and its pro-governmental organisations started to press for the resignation of the Estonian government, adding international dimension to the domestic affairs. All these events have raised several questions: What has happened? Why did it happen? Are they part of general developments? Or is it just a small exception? Was it an internal conflict or a part of a broader international conflict? Although a year has passed since the troubled April days, we are still unable to find proper answers, and there are far too many different narratives circling around to explain the events. The following article includes different perspectives and also dimensions to understand the complexity of the April 2007 events in Estonia. The author claims that the most comprehensive way to define the conflict is to analyse it in the framework of “War of Memories” and that it is crucial to analyse the events separately on domestic and international levels.

1. How to understand the concept of “War of Memories”?

“War of Memories” is more complex to understand than war because it is related to more abstract phenomena than a regular war. This notion includes the complex process of identity formation, which is supported by constant propaganda to establish the loyalty of masses for the purpose of the war. To better understand the process, the author explains, firstly, the process of identity formation and the role of “memory” in this process. Thereafter, it will be discussed how propaganda is used in the War of

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Memories as its means. Thus, being a psychological war, it aims at winning the hearts and minds of people.

Identity formation is a relational process, which requires the conceptual pair of “Self” and “Other” (Neumann, 1998:17). In the context of international relations, one should analyse the formation of collective identity, a process which is crucial to understanding how nations define themselves in world politics and how they try to build borders between themselves and others. Therefore, the relation between self and other is the key to state identification, and international relations studies focus on this relational pair by analysing how the border is built between self and other and what the meaning of the other is, because it is as crucial as identity itself.

The formation of collective identity in the context of international relations can be defined as nation-building process which aims at the result whereby “inhabitants of a state’s territory come to be loyal citizens of that state” (Bloom, 1990:55). Moreover, Bloom claimed that the nation-building process is a crucial source for foreign policy because successful nation-building forms “a clear political solidarity in relation to the external environment” (Bloom, 1990:58). Therefore, it is important to understand what the source of national identity is. Bloom (1990) referred to it as “national identity dynamics” (79-80). One of the most important sources of loyalty is evoked by national consciousness, which is based on the “the myths, memories, traditions, and symbols of ethnic heritage and in the ways in which a popular living past has been, and can be, rediscovered and reinterpreted by modern nationalist intelligentsia.” (Smith, 1999:9).

National consciousness is strongly related to national collective memory, which is framed by national history narratives, which defined group relations with others in the past, but at the same time also prescribes behaviour in the present as well as in the future. Therefore, memory studies analyse “the representations and images, myths and values recognized or tolerated by groups or the entire society, and which constitute the content of collective psychologies” (Mandrou 1985, cited in Confino 1997:1389). To conclude, collective memory is a crucial element for national identity and it defines self-perception and perceptions of others for a nationally conscious person. Therefore, collective national memory can be also a crucial element of state foreign policy, which can be legitimised through a collective national past or mobilise a nationally
conscious people to protect the national identity. This last one can be defined as securitisation of the national identity through collective memory.

In defining the significance of memory in the identity formation process, it is important to understand its role in international relations. Collective memory defines the values and beliefs of a society. And beliefs are an important source for international behaviour of a nation (Jervise, 1989). The beliefs about the other and the expectations of the other’s behaviour are defined by collective memory. Hence, War of Memories occurs in a case of clashing collective memories when different nations have contradicting memories of the common past. It leads to a situation where national identities are perceived as being under threat and therefore it may cause the securitisation of collective memory by the political elite of the nation. Challenging national identity is an essential crisis for each nationally conscious person, and therefore the memory securitization is very easy to accomplish. However, the author claims that War of Memories is subject to political manipulation and occurs in a context where the government demonstrates that national identity is threatened and would be enhanced through a policy that masses would be mobilised to support (Bloom, 1990:79).

In a War of Memories, governments highlight the clash points of collective memories to mobilise the masses so as to get support for its policies; it leads to securitisation of national memories and through it also of national identity. Securitisation means that the government highlights policies related to the securitised objects as extraordinary ones, which should not be discussed or challenged by internal forces (Buzan, 1996). Any contradiction is considered a sign of betrayal and is therefore a security threat. To gain public support and to justify their policies governments use propaganda. In this article, the definition of propaganda is borrowed from P. M. Taylor who states that propaganda should be understood more objectively “as a process for the showing, germination and cultivation of ideas” (Taylor, 2003:2). According to this definition, propaganda is common in all societies and forms a crucial part in power struggle; it is the main instrument of psychological warfare. Governments use collective memory as a source for their propaganda, at the same time reproducing the narratives and myths, which reconstruct the collective memory and national identity, strengthening beliefs, which make states act towards each
other. Therefore, very often one’s belief is perceived by others as propaganda and vice versa.

Taylor claimed that propaganda has been a natural part of all wars, being a crucial instrument to win the mental battles and to create myths (Taylor, 2003:5). Although Taylor defined propaganda as a side effect of a war, but as important as any other weapon, in the case of War of Memories, propaganda takes a dominant place in the battles because it aims at changing someone’s beliefs and values to win over their loyalty. Therefore “War of Memories” is a long-running process, which can be escalated and de-escalated during different periods, depending on the parties’ actions; it can also cause some bigger or smaller outbursts, e.g. April 2007 events in Tallinn.

In the context of the War of Memories, the commemorative activities play a key role. Commemoration is meant “to remember a past event that is considered important for the community or the state” (Onken, January 2007:23). It can be applied by a commemoration day or some certain objects – memorials. Therefore, memorials are important elements for collective memory because they are symbols of the past and by commemoration they help to underline the significance of some certain event. The memorials become especially important in the context of active contest, struggle or annihilation (Gillis, 1994:5), which is part of a War of Memories. In this context, the memorials will be given significance that includes the crucial part of national identity. Through the memorials, the abstract quarrel is materialised and those visual objects make the War more understandable. By giving significance, the governmental propaganda facilitates the cultivation of ideas among the population. Therefore, actions towards memorials in a War of Memories have very symbolic meanings, and it carries a crucial function in the propaganda of a state. Thus, the role of memorials in the War of Memories can play a key role, as happened in Estonia.

The following part of the article deals with the Estonian case of War of Memories. The theoretical framework defined above facilitates understanding of the April 2007 events in Tallinn. The author claims that the riots were only an outburst and escalation of the longer War of Memories. Therefore the article is focused on a longer period than April 2007. It is important to draw a line between the domestic and external
dimensions of this conflict to comprehend the motivation of different agents.

2. War of Memories - the Estonian domestic dimension

By the time of the re-establishment of its independence, Estonia’s ethnic composition was totally changed in comparison to the pre-World War II period of independence. Almost 40% of the population were non-Estonians and the majority of them migrated to Estonia during the Soviet occupation. In 1992, the Estonian Citizenship Law from 1938 was restored and all Estonian inhabitants who came to Estonia after June 1940 (the month when the Soviet occupation started in Estonia) and their descendants had to gain Estonian citizenship through naturalisation. It made almost one-third of Estonia’s population, mostly Russian-speakers, foreigners or non-citizens (Budryte, 2005:65-66). It was the Estonian government’s first act of nation-building, defining the immediate members of the group and who did not to belong there by identifying those who had to prove their loyalty to the Estonian state in order to become members of Estonian citizenry. Although during the past 15 years almost 40% of them have been naturalised, others are without citizenship (25%) or have either taken a different citizenship (predominantly the Russian Federation) or left Estonia (Statistics of Citizenship, 2007). The division between Estonian and Russian-speaking communities has not disappeared but rather consolidated as a border between two communities. Those two communities are, in everyday life, relatively separated and also have different values and beliefs. Not surprisingly the communities do not share the same collective memory and the April 2007 events were just one example of it. The focus of those events was World War II and war memorials as the landmarks in collective memories. Firstly, those two different collective memory narratives are defined as identity sources for two communities. It defines the different understandings about the past and origin of people in Estonia and offers a better understanding of what the quarrel is about in this conflict. Thereafter the developments in Estonia during the last three-four years will be analysed by defining the explanations of those events and indicating the role of collective memory in the process.
2.1 The Estonian community’s view

Estonian national consciousness had already been developed before the establishment of an independent Estonian state, therefore it has an exclusive character. The following part depicts the current predominant understanding of the past among the ethnic Estonians. The Estonian governments have supported this narrative and thus, since the restoration of an independent Estonia, the nation-building process has been based mostly on the nation-state principle that Estonia is home for the ethnic Estonians and all the others are guests/foreigners who have to accommodate to Estonian society. According to the Estonian national history narrative, Estonian independence was declared in 1918 and confirmed by the Tartu Peace Treaty in 1920. In 1940, the Soviet Union violated the earlier treaties and forced Estonia to accept its regime, which started the 50-year occupation. In 1941, the Soviet occupation was replaced by the Nazi occupation, which lasted more than three years, and thereafter the Soviet troops restored the earlier occupation. Estonian men used the German army (Estonian Waffen SS) to fight against the approaching Red Army. This fight is considered as the last Independence War against the Soviet Union. On September 22nd, 1944, Tallinn was taken from the legitimate Estonian government, which had managed to take power from the German occupation forces a couple of days before. Therefore the Red Army did not liberate Tallinn and Estonia but conquered it and re-established the Soviet occupation, which caused huge casualties (estimated 17.5% of the population) (Estonian State Commission on Examination of the Policies of Repression, 2005). This national history narrative underlines the victimisation of the Estonians and offers justification for the chosen nation-building process.

In addition, the de-legitimization of the Soviet history narrative also required a reassessment of the national history of Estonia. During the Soviet occupation, men who fought for Estonian independence were condemned as fascists. Therefore, according to the Estonian national elite in the restored independent Estonian Republic, justice should be restored and the Estonian soldiers should be respected and honoured as freedom fighters. In addition, Estonia should remove all symbols of the occupations, Soviet ones as well as Nazi symbols, because both regimes were equally criminal by causing a lot of suffering for Estonians. The war memorial in Tonismäe (“The Bronze Soldier”) was perceived as a symbol
of the Soviet occupation, and the most disconcerting aspect was that Estonian Russian-speakers celebrated May 9\textsuperscript{th} (the Soviet Victory Day) and September 22\textsuperscript{nd} (anniversary of Tallinn’s conquest) with different Russian/Soviet flags in the middle of the Estonian capital, next to the Estonian national parliament. It was perceived as disrespect towards the Estonian independent state and Estonians’ sufferings during the occupation years.

2.2 The Russian-speaking community’s view

The Russian-speaking community’s collective memory from the Soviet period is totally opposite and for them it is difficult to understand why the Estonian government pushed them out of the Estonian political community. The restoration of the Estonian independence was not a convincing argument for them. The majority of the Estonian Russian-speaking community or their ancestors arrived to Estonia during the Soviet years: some of them were directed to Estonia by the Soviet labour and migration policies, some came to Estonia because it offered them better opportunities and living standards. Estonia was perceived as a part of the Soviet Union and therefore migration to Estonian territories was perceived as regular domestic migration and not as a colonial policy, like it is depicted by the Estonian narrative. During the restoration of the Estonian independence, a significant part of the Russian-speakers supported an independent Estonia; as well as the other part, although smaller but the most active one, was strongly against it. Therefore, restoration of the old citizenship law was a disappointment for the Russian-speaking community and the introduction of the Law on Aliens in 1993 was perceived by them as ethnic cleansing (Budryte, 2005:72). The Russian-speakers did not share with the Estonians the undisputable position of the Estonian national narrative that Estonia was forcefully occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940. In 2005, 56% saw it as voluntary act and only 30% of the Russian-speakers agreed with the Estonian position (Vetik, 2007).

The Russian-speaking community shares a common understanding about the Second World War with Russia, which defines it as the Great Patriotic War and depicts it as the Russians’ self-denying fight against evil fascism. Therefore, on September 22, Tallinn was liberated from fascists, and the Estonians, as all other European nations, should be grateful to the Russians for liberating Europe from the criminal Nazi occupation. It is important to
underline that, among Russian-speakers in Estonia, as well among the Russians in Russia, the Great Patriotic War is perceived as a people’s fight against fascism, not as a fight for Stalin or for the communists, as the Estonian narrative depicts it (Pavlovskiy, 2008). It is also difficult to understand the victimization of the Estonians because, according to the Russian collective memory, everybody suffered, and Russians were the biggest victims (Lotman, 2007). The Estonian government’s policy towards the Memorial of Tallinn Liberation (“The Bronze Soldier”) was perceived as a denial of the sacrifice of the Russian people and an equalization of the Soviet regime with the Nazi one, almost as criminal as the latter regime itself. In addition, the Memorial that symbolised occupation for the Estonians has a totally different significance for the Russian-speaking community. Astrov claimed that the intensity of the Estonian Russian-speakers’ self-identification with the monument may be explained by the structural similarity between theirs and the monument’s status within the structure of the Estonian society. Both the Russian-speakers and the monument were excluded from the proper public sphere. At the same time, in this capacity, they served as markers of the foundations of the Estonian statehood: as long as the restored Estonian state defined itself by reference to the occupation, the monument and the Estonian Russian-speakers (as “colonists”) served as a marker of this specific foundation of Estonian state (Astrov, 2007).

2.3 Domestic factors for escalating the conflict

The April 2007 events were the culmination of the tensions between the above mentioned collective memories. Although the violent outburst was surprising and shocking for both communities in Estonia, the conflicting narratives and understandings were identified in the society earlier. The question of the removal of the “Bronze Soldier” was raised already in the 1990s, but the politicians could not manage to resolve the issue. In 2002, a memorial for the Estonians who fought in the German army was erected, and thereafter quickly removed in Pärnu. The real escalation of tensions started with the first battle of the “Memorials War” in Lihula, in 2004. As mentioned above, memorials play a crucial role in the War of Memories as commemoration objects. In the following, firstly, a short description of those events will be given; thereafter the domestic factors will be analysed.
The events in the Western Estonian municipality of Lihula are the trigger of the “Memorials War” in Estonia. In August 2004, the municipality of Lihula led by the national-radicals decided to erect a monument, “To the Estonian men who fought in 1940-1945 against Bolshevism and for the restoration of the Estonian independence”; this war monument was removed in 2002 from Parnu, the neighbouring town (BBC, 2004). During the Soviet times, those soldiers were officially condemned and considered as fascists, because they fought in the German army. In the current Estonian collective memory, they are honoured as freedom fighters who tried to use the last chance to stop the Soviet occupation. Thus, the men’s motivation to fight in German uniform is controversial. The erection of the war monument caused a strong international outcry, referring to an Estonian wish to rewrite history and glorify the war criminals (Droge, 2004; Simon Wiesenthal Centre, 2004). Although an Estonian semiotic analysis reached the conclusion that the monument was not depicting a Nazi soldier but had several particular elements of Estonian symbols, the Estonian government could not explain it to the international public and the monument was removed (Postimees, 2004). The removal caused resistance, and Estonian riot police had to intervene in the process. This event marked the first step towards the securitisation of the Estonian collective national memory and gave grounds for the Estonian national radicals to claim that the Estonian national identity was threatened.

The “Memorial War” was intensified step by step after the Lihula events in 2004. Although the Soviet monument in Tonismäe was blemished by vandals in 2005, and also some other monuments were damaged, the public opinion nevertheless did not consider it a major issue. According to Juhan Kivirähk (2005), the majority of the Estonian population presumed it a normal phenomenon that war veterans were gathering at the “Bronze Soldier”; he estimated that less than 25% of the ethnic Estonians did not tolerate it (BNS, 2005). But, a year later, the Estonian nationalist radicals as well as their Russian-speaking community counterparts were dominating in the public discourse. In May 2006, the nationalist forces in both communities defined their positions: the Estonian national-conservative political party Pro Patria required the removal of the “Bronze Soldier”, and a Russian-speaking political party, the Constitutional Party, declared that they would defend the statue. In addition to the political parties, the radical movements were involved in the debate, which culminated in the Estonian national radicals’ provocative demonstration in the middle of the Russian-
speakers’ Victory Day celebration at the “Bronze Soldier” on May 9th, 2006. To avoid a bigger conflict, the police removed a small Estonian group from the Russian-speaking crowd, but it raised the discussion in the Estonian public discourse, as to why the Soviet flags were tolerated and the Estonian one was removed in the middle of the capital of independent Estonia; and why the monument in Lihula was removed so quickly, while in Tallinn the government’s policies were toothless (Postimees, 2006a; Postimees, 2006b). That was the second step for involving the collective memories more and more in the political debate and to mobilise the nationally conscious people for the support of a certain idea.

All those sudden issues involved the government more and more in a conflict they wanted to avoid. The turmoil in May 2006 can be considered as the hijacking of the political forum by the radicals who started escalating the tensions and emphasised the clash between two different collective memories. The manipulation with the national consciousness forced the government to get involved in the public debate, and politicians had to take positions on the issue of the monument. During the period of May-July 2006, the Estonian and the Russian media focused heavily on the “Bronze Soldier” issue. Politicians, with their public statements pro or contra removal of the monument, escalated the tensions in society even more (Konno, 2006). On the one hand, the radicals’ actions and statements forced the government to take positions and actions; on the other hand, those acts and statements gave more ground to broaden the debate, which earlier was located in the periphery of the public discourse. Also, the discussion changed public opinion in Estonia and deepened the polarisation between the Estonian and Russian-speaking communities: by the end of May, 53% of the ethnic Estonians supported removal of the “Bronze Soldier”, 29% were against; 16% of the Russian-speakers supported it and 73% were against it (BNS, 2006).

One very important domestic factor in the escalation of the War on Memories was the elections to the Estonian national parliament, Riigikogu, in March 2007. It was strongly related to the previous factor and was one of the reasons why the radicals managed to raise this peripheral issue to the centre of political debate. In his media report, Konno concluded that one of the most common positions in the media, and mostly in the Estonian media, was that the “Bronze Soldier” was put into service to gain political support (Konno, 2006:10). However, this forced and uncomfortable
situation for the politicians was gradually transforming to an active pre-election campaign. Whereas at the beginning the political parties were forced to become involved in the debate over the "Bronze Soldier", then later the political parties started using collective memory for their own benefit. As much as the main coalition partners differed in their positions (the Reform Party supported the transfer of the monument to the military cemetery and the Centre Party supported the status quo), at the beginning it was considered as an unsuccessful attempt to break the coalition (Savisaar, 2006). In the second half of the year, the parties were already more openly disagreeing on this issue, and it became an important topic in the pre-election debates, occupying more space than it was worth. At this point, it is important to analyse the motivations of the main parties.

The biggest clash was between the Reform Party and the Centre Party. Pro Patria and Res Publica, representing national-conservative forces, had strong positions on this issue already earlier - the "Bronze Soldier" should be removed. The Social Democrats and the People's Party tried to avoid taking clear positions; however, the Social Democrats tended rather to support the transfer of the monument and the People's Union rather not. The Centre Party has the biggest Russian-speaking electorate in Estonia, and therefore this party became the defender of the idea that the war monument should stay in Tonismäe because it is an important symbol for about 200000 inhabitants of Estonia (Savisaar, 2006). In contrast to the Estonian mass media, the Russian mass media in Estonia did not make any big difference between the Estonian political parties, and all Estonians were accused of nationalism and, in the worst cases, even of fascism; the transfer of the "Bronze Soldier" was seen as the expression of those tendencies in the Estonian society (Konno, 2006:10). Therefore, it was crucial for the Centre Party to take a very clear stance on this issue, as not to lose the Russian-speaking electorate. The public opinion poll demonstrated that the Centre Party lost almost 10% of its Russian-speaking electorate (TSN EMOR, 2006). It is also important to mention that one of the Russian-speaking parties (the Constitutional Party) was very closely related to the Russian-speakers’ radical movement "Night Watch" and therefore could gain the votes lost by the Centre Party.

The Reform Party was focused on gaining votes from the Estonian electorate. In the elections of 2003, a new political force, Res Publica, won big support and took votes from the national party Pro Patria with its mild
national rhetoric. For the elections in 2007, Pro Patria and Res Publica merged into a moderate national-conservative party Pro Patria and Res Publica Union. The Reform Party could see the necessity of increasing its national stance. In addition, being in government during the events in May 2006, prescribed a more national rhetoric for this party. The public opinion polls showed that the united Pro Patria and Res Publica was catching up on the Reform Party and the latter was losing its electorate (Koch, 2006). In addition, the Reform party had been the major counterweight to the Centre Party and the earlier main dividing issue of tax policy was overshadowed by the debates, which were supported by the collective memory arguments, making the “Bronze Soldier” one of the main topic in the elections. After winning elections and forming a coalition, the Reform Party and the Pro Patria Res Publica Union had to implement the policies they promised during the election campaign. In this way, those parties were hostages to their own tactics of using the collective memory in their election campaigns.

The broader domestic background of the War of Memories is related to the Estonian nation-building process and the failed integration policy. Estonia, like any other post-soviet nation, faced the challenge of state- and nation-building. The above-mentioned restoration policy was based on exclusion rhetoric, and the bigger part of the Russian-speaking minority was treated as immigrants. The identity construction was supported by a collective memory, which did not consider the local Russian-speaking community as a natural part of the Estonian society. The constructed national history narrative focused on the expression of suppressed memories about repression and injustice during the Soviet years and did not include at all other nations living in Estonia (Onken, January 2007:33). Focusing on Estonians and relying on the nation-state principle, the Russian-speaking minority was presented as an undesirable relic of the Soviet period. Thus, the Russian-speaking population could not find a proper place in Estonian nation-building and was has hindered by the identity formation of this community - they are not considered as Russians in Russia; at the same time, they are not taken as Estonians in Estonia, because the definition of an Estonian is narrowly based on the ethnic Estonians.

During the 1990s, the Russian-speaking community was associated with Russia, and, as much Russia was considered as the biggest threat for
Estonians, then, instead of constructing an including narrative for all people living in Estonia, the formed identity excluded most of the Russian-speaking people. The only way to become included was to learn the Estonian language, and this became the main measurement of loyalty to the Estonian state. By the turn of the century, the appearance of a new inclusive identity was notable but the Lihula events in 2004 established a new confrontation (Ehala, 2007:5). The confrontation of the 1990s was more related to the Russian threat; the new confrontation was more heavily related to the collective memories. However, the division before the April 2007 events was not so strongly based on ethnic division, and Ehala claims in his report that around 40% of the Estonian population was ready to take up the new inclusive identity, but the radicals on both sides managed to establish a new dividing line (Ehala, 2007:7). At this point, one can see the influence of the clashing collective memories. The formation of a common identity required a uniting collective memory, but it was missing, and the identity formation processes escalated the War of Memories which existed already earlier. It is also important to underline Russia’s policies as an external factor in this process but this issue will be discussed later.

Government’s ignorance towards integration issues and the neglected policy cultivation of the Russian-speaking community were important factors for the April 2007 events. The Estonian government was not able to understand that, when they want to achieve their goals, they have to deal efficiently in propaganda among the Russian-speaking community. Instead of cultivating its ideas among the Russian-speakers, the Estonian government focused on the Estonians and offered arguments why this policy was important. In case the statements of the Estonian politicians reached the Russian-speaking community, the argumentation was given in the framework of Estonian collective memory and therefore was not well understood by the Russian-speaking recipients, which deepened even more the feeling that the Estonians wanted revenge by removing the monument and facilitated the victimisation tendencies among the Russian-speakers. This community was neglected and the situation was escalated by the position of the Estonian government that they do not have any serious political representation in Estonia to negotiate with (Berg, 2007). The Russian-speaking community felt that they were left aside and the removal of the “Bronze Soldier” was an example of their marginalisation in the Estonian society. Therefore one additional factor was also a feeling of disappointment that the government did not take their opinion into
consideration, and the big secrecy surrounding the transfer of the memorial caused a lot of distrust towards the Estonian government (Vetik, 2007:3).

To conclude the domestic factors of the War of Memories, it is important to emphasise the domination of radicals in both communities, which forced the inclusion of this topic into the main political discourse and, during the pre-election period, transformed it into a part of the election campaign. In addition, the misperception of integration and ethnocentric nation-building processes were the reasons and a fertile soil for the clash of conflicting collective memories. However, understanding of the conflict would not be comprehensive if the international dimension was excluded.

3. War of Memories - the international dimension

At the beginning of the April riots in Tallinn, the Estonian government had a firm position that it was a domestic issue and therefore Estonia didn’t need any international support or involvement. When the events developed further and the Estonian Embassy in Moscow was besieged by the pro-Kremlin youth movement Nashi, the Estonian government realised that it was more than a domestic conflict and vandalism in Tallinn. Later, it was even comfortable to solely blame Russia for it and to avoid acknowledging the domestic reasons for the conflict. Hereby, the article defines two aspects in the international dimension of the War of Memories: the general context of the conflict and the battlefield actions.

3.1 War of Memories - Russia vs. Central and Eastern Europe

The author claims that the “Memorials War” in Estonia is only one battlefield of a general reviewing of European history. By the end of World War II, Central and Eastern European nations found themselves in the iron grip of the Soviet Union. The misunderstandings and roles of different nations in the war were not discussed, but the Soviet historical narrative replaced all possible individual memories. To survive this potential schizophrenia, nations had to accept a voluntary amnesia (Judt, 2002:167). The collapse of the Soviet Union opened a new chance to look at the national pasts and to change the dominant Soviet history narrative with national ones by questioning the taboo issues from the past. Russia, as the successor state of the Soviet Union, was also trying to redefine its identity. Fifteen years later, the European geopolitical map was changed by the
enlargement of the European Union and NATO. The former Soviet countries feel themselves as fully-pledged members of Europe and, on the European level, the earlier European understandings of the past are challenged. Western Europe has the problem of a shortage of memory, aiming to forget the horrors of the war; Central and Eastern Europe have the problem of too many memories and unanswered questions (Judt, 2002:172). Many questions make them look inquisitively at Russia but they find in bewilderment that Russia has returned to the earlier Soviet narratives. That is the main reason for collective memory clashes in Central and Eastern Europe.

The former Soviet bloc countries are interested in that their sufferings are fairly treated, and therefore the Central and Eastern European countries lobby for the position that Nazism and communism are similar totalitarian regimes (Lauristin, 2007:403). Those countries have raised the issue of condemnation of communism crimes in the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly. In 2006, it adopted the resolution 1481 “Need for International Condemnation of Crimes of Totalitarian Communist Regimes”, which was relatively toothless because of the strong resistance by the Russian and Unified European Left delegates (Onken, January 2007:31-32). Also, in the European Parliament, the delegates from the Central and Eastern European countries lobby for a universal European condemnation of communists’ crimes. Estonia has strongly supported these initiatives. The Estonian case was perceived by Russia as a dangerous precedent, which, if left without punishment, would cause a “domino effect” in the region, and also other countries who question the liberator role of the Soviet Union may take up similar activities. The Estonian policy found support and encouraged similar debates in other Central and Eastern European countries, e.g. Poland (dgs/ ap/ dpa, 2007).

In addition, one can see the War of Memories on the bilateral level. At the same time as the Central and Eastern European countries deal with the condemnation of the communist past on the European level, Russia has been focused on strengthening its national pride through the glorious victory in World War II. This war plays a crucial role in the Russian collective memory. It is depicted as the heroic fight of the people against the evil fascists who wanted to annihilate the Russian people; therefore it was not an ideological war but a fight for life or death, and the Russians managed to win it (Pavlovskiy, 2008). The first bigger clash on the bilateral
level was related to the grandiose celebrations of the 60-year anniversary of the end of the Great Patriotic War in 2005. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin invited the world leaders to celebrate the event in Moscow, including the Baltic as well as Polish presidents. The Estonian and Lithuanian presidents declined the invitation, claiming that this day was not a celebration for their nations; the Latvian and Polish presidents decided to participate but actively raised the issue of the Eastern European view of World War II (Onken, January 2007:39-40). This event also started an active historical debate inside those countries. On the one hand, the Estonian government focused on uncovering and publicizing the crimes of the Soviet occupation (e.g. White Book: Estonian State Commission on Examination of the Policies of Repression, 2005), and strengthening the victimisation of the Estonians. On the other hand, the Russian politicians denied the occupation of the Baltic states, and its historians started to publish literature, which showed that the Soviet repressions in the Baltic states were overestimated (e.g. “Myth about Genocide: Soviet Repressions in Estonia (1940-1953)” by Alexandr Dyukov, 2007). This “debate” does not target the historians in Estonia or Russia but is meant for propaganda to convince the audience of the truth of the narrative of their collective memory.

This broader context is important for understanding the significance of the “Memorials War” in Estonia. The conflict around the war monuments in Estonia is only a little battle in the bigger War of Memories, and it is crucial to realise the general framework of the conflict for analysing the international dimension of this quarrel. It is not only an Estonian-Russian bilateral issue, but a part of a general reconstruction of a common European identity and its collective memory on the one side; on the other side, it is part of the Russian collective memory consolidation and the reconstruction of a (post-)imperial identity.

3.2 War of Memories - “Battlefield Estonia”

Below I analyse the Russian and Estonian actions during the period of the “Bronze Soldier” crisis and show how both sides tried to legitimise their activities. The clash of collective memories of the two communities in Estonia would get much less attention if it only stayed inside the borders of Estonia. Russia used the possibility to play its role in the full scale and its behaviour escalated the conflict inside Estonia and rendered it the
European and even the North-Atlantic dimension. The Estonian politicians used Russia’s overreactions as a shield to cover their shortcomings and failures, and the initial position of it being a domestic problem which was successfully replaced by a picture that it was all organised and conducted from Moscow. The latter version facilitated the mobilisation of the Estonian population and gave the government a skyrocketing support (84% of the ethnic Estonians supported the government’s policies (TNS EMOR, 2007)).

Although the propaganda war between Estonia and Russia existed before the April riots in Tallinn, the initial position of the Estonian government was that it was an Estonian domestic issue and that no other country should be involved in this process. Emotional Russian statements and youth demonstrations at the Estonian Embassy in Moscow made the Estonian government separate the internal conflict from Russia’s policies. Therefore, Estonia was looking for the support from its allies for claiming that Russia should not be involved in the Estonian internal affairs (Postimees, 2007, online). The aim of the Estonian government was to demonstrate that Estonia is a sovereign nation and that no other country, particularly Russia as the former occupant nation, should prescribe the policies for Estonia. In the context of the War of Memories, it was a very important symbolic act of emancipation from the collective memory - a sovereign nation has the right to understand its past as it wants. The Russian politicians’ claims that the Estonian government’s activities were the reasons for war (MP D. Rogozin, April 19th, 2007 (Rosbalt, 2007)) or that the Estonian government should resign (head of the Russian State Duma delegation to Estonia L. Slutski, April 30th, 2007 (Postimees, 2007a)) were useful statements for the Estonian government’s propaganda to consolidate the Estonian nation and to demonstrate that Russia was challenging the Estonian collective memory, identity and independence. This policy worked effectively to mobilise the ethnic Estonians, but at the same time it alienated the non-Estonian population who did not show their loyalty to the Estonian government and mainly condemned the government’s policies (TNS EMOR, 2007). It offers the possibility to measure the success of the Estonian and Russian sides in the battle for the hearts and minds.

It is also important to analyse how the battle over the hearts and minds worked. The Estonian official policy is that the Estonian state language is
Estonian, and therefore the Estonian government has not established any public Russian language TV channel. Although the Russian-speaking elite has lobbied for the idea of establishing an information channel in Russian to inform the Russian-speakers in their native language, this idea has not found strong support among the Estonian politicians (Mikko, 2007). The major problem is that the Estonian and Russian-speaking communities live in different information spaces - the Estonians get information from the Estonian channels and the Russian-speakers receive it predominantly from Russia's TV channels. It is not only a problem that the Estonians and the Russian-speakers perceive the world differently, but it has also caused the situation where Russia has the possibility to socialise and form the worldview of the majority of the Estonian Russian-speaking community (Kalev, 2007:3). In this situation, the Estonian government’s policies have created an advantageous situation for the Russian government to spread its propaganda among the Estonian Russian-speakers. In the international context, the behaviour of Russia’s politicians and pro-Kremlin activists seemed to be very irrational. Instead of convincing the international public that their positions were right and Estonia was the wrongdoer, their activities rather seemed to harm Russia’s international status. At the same time, it was very useful for the internal audience and also not less valuable to gain the loyalty of the Estonian Russian-speakers.

In addition to the statements, which claimed the injustice and discrimination of Russian-speakers by the Estonian government, the glorification of the past heroism of the war veterans, underlining the sacrifices of those killed in the war, was undertaken. Russian propaganda was based on a clear-cut logic: if one does not accept the fact that the Red Army liberated Europe from fascism, then the one supports fascism, the biggest evil in the world. Those people do not deserve respect, and the governments who are against Russia’s narrative are as inhuman and criminal as the Nazi government was. Therefore, on the Internet, large amount of video material was spread around about the arrests by the Estonian police, with a Nazi musical background; the Estonian Ambassador in Moscow was depicted with Hitler’s moustache; the name of the Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip was written AnSSip, etc. All those symbols underlined the anti-fascist emotions in the Russian collective memory and aimed at comparing Estonia with the Nazi-Germany, which deserves at least heavy contempt, if not in fact war. In addition, Russia’s mass media also created powerful symbols, e.g. Dmitriy Ganin, a 20-year
old citizen of the Russian Federation, who was killed during the riot nights in Tallinn. He was made a martyr in the Russian media to show how the Estonian police tortured him and left him to die (Pesur, 2007). Some Russian politicians even proposed to rename the street in Moscow where the Estonian Embassy is located into Dmitriy Ganin Street, after the hero who protected the memorial of his ancestors (MK.RU, 2007). This propaganda worked effectively to sow distrust among the Russian-speakers towards any information that was offered by the Estonian government, and most of the events were commented on in the context of the Russian narrative.

The Estonian mass media and public were also dominated by government propaganda that aimed at building full loyalty for the government. The above-mentioned mobilisation of the society was achieved by demonstrating Russian wish to restore its earlier power over Estonia. The Estonian politician Mart Laar compared Slutski’s statement about the resignation of the Estonian government with the events in 1940, when Estonia was occupied by the Soviets (Postimees, 2007b). In addition, the increasing tension in Moscow around the Estonian Embassy, culminating with the assault on the Estonian Ambassador Marina Kaljurand, turned her into an Estonian national heroine. Also, the Estonian government spread the information that the cyber assaults against the Estonian governmental and public servers traced back to the Kremlin offices (Postimees, 2007c). However, the external experts did not find very strong evidence of the Kremlin’s involvement (Lesk, July/August 2007:76). At the same time, when the Estonian government used Russia as the historical enemy in order to evoke the loyalty of Estonians, the internal opposition was condemned heavily. The dominating discourse was: We have to support the government and deal with the problems later because Estonia is under threat. Firstly, the mayor of Tallinn and leader of the Centre Party, Edgar Savisaar, was condemned publicly because of his criticism of the government policies and his inactivity towards easing the tensions in Tallinn (TNS EMOR, 2007). His behaviour was considered as treason and his closer relations with the Russian political elite were underlined. It is unclear what exactly his motivation during this crisis was, but most probably it can be classified as the culmination of the confrontation from the election campaigns. Secondly, social scientists were also condemned and labelled as “red scientists” (meaning pro-Marxism and pro-communism) because they raised the issue of the shortcomings of the
Estonian nation-building process and the failure of the integration process (Pilvre, 2007). By this labelling, the statements and conclusions of those scholars were undermined because it established a clear connection with the Soviet past and, in the Estonian collective memory, everything related to the Soviet period is perceived as negative and untrue.

During the crisis, the fierce battle for the hearts and minds worked effectively for both sides and established a strong polarisation in the Estonian society, simultaneously shaking up the Estonian ignorance towards the integration issues and giving ground for rethinking the principles of the current integration policy. In the context of the international dimension, it was only a short period of intensification of the conflict (maybe even a litmus test) but the War of Memories has lasted longer and will continue. According to the research by the University of Tallinn (2007), naturalisation in Estonia slowed down and differences in the understanding of the past increased during last years (Heidmets, 2007:1). It shows that it is a long-running process and there are likely to be escalations in the conflict, some of which may be shocking outburst like those in Tallinn in 2007, or the “Memorials War”, which was just a battlefield of the War of Memories.

Conclusions:
What can be learned from the Estonian case?

War of Memories is a long-lasting psychological conflict, which can be more intensive or less notable but it is a constant process. The Estonian case was only one of the battlefields that currently exist in the Central and Eastern Europe. To define the lessons learned from the Estonian case, it is important to start from the general context. The main lesson for Europe is that it should be able to define a new collective memory and particularly review the memories of the 20th Century because it is the most painful period. The dominant narrative, that it was only a fight against fascism, is not plausible anymore. There are too many alternative versions, which all need some attention. To deny those memories and to look only to the future does not resolve the problem because collective memory plays an important role in identity formation and there should be a common understanding about the past. Also, European identity needs some common narrative to build its identity on. Requiring the European Union new members to adopt the old narrative does not work, because it forces
them again to a collective amnesia that also existed during the Soviet time, and it only undermined the general narrative. Russia is promoting the old narrative to avoid looking at its own past, and this narrative is more understandable to Western European countries. It is something they are used to but it only accommodates the situation of two levels of sufferings, like it was expressively described by the Estonian member of the European Parliament, Katrin Saks (Alandi, 2008). Therefore, in the European context, the new understanding of the past should be defined.

In the context of the Estonian domestic dimension, the greater turbulence is over and all the new ideas provided to alleviate the crisis are forgotten. If Estonia wants to avoid those conflicts in the future, then the integration process should become a national priority. The notion of integration should be redefined and it should be more than only learning the Estonian language. During the crisis, some politicians realised that integration is the mutual approach of two communities to each other. It also requires reviewing the principles of nation-building, which would not focus anymore on the ethnic-based nation state but on a multi-national state. The identity of the Estonians as people living in Estonia should be created, and therefore the collective memory also needs reviewing, which is probably the most painful and difficult process. To diminish the influence of Russia’s involvement as the main disturbing factor of integration, acceptance of the Russian language into the public sphere (Russian public information TV channel, providing state information also in Russian) should be given. Those policies need a long-term consensus and an open debate to include different opinions and not to build a new identity, which includes some but at the same time excludes others. Therefore openness and tolerance towards different opinions should be encouraged by the government. It would mean that the Estonian government de-securitised the nation-building process.

To conclude, identity formation is a long and difficult process and the results of the decisions, in one way or the other, are notable only over several years and decades. Identity is not an a ready-made unchanging product; it is constantly changing to be in accord with realities. It is important to bear in mind that inclusive identity formation decreases the disappointments and marginalisation of social groups, which is the biggest potential internal threat in case of a recurring War of Memories, which
challenges the existing identities. And it is important not only in the context of one nation but also for the entire Europe.

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