

CAN THE BALTIC STATES BE DEFENDED?

AN ESSAY ON MACRO-HISTORY AND SEMANTICS

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Questions

The answer to the title-question can be given very bluntly: - Of course, 'the Baltics' can be defended, as they have been throughout the periodically turbulent history of thousand years, from the Viking Age onwards.¹ However we assess their evolving through various enforced alliances, the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian nations exist today - politically independent and free.

Have 'the Baltics' then been defended successfully? And to be precise, what does the verb 'defend' mean? What were and are actually 'the Baltics'? Was there, and is there such a thing today as 'the Baltics', in history and in modern security politics? Which were the contributing and decisive 'Baltic' defensive factors throughout the centuries? Is there any historical or geopolitical pattern discernible, which might guide modern strategists?

Instead of enumerating all the wars, battles and skirmishes in and around the 'Baltics' from times immemorial, i.e. from the oldest known Western and Eastern onslaughts in the 11th century², let us first try to define the terms 'Baltic' and 'defence' - to ascertain at least a formal inter-subjective understanding of the rather impressionistic in-depth analysis to follow.

'The Baltics'

Today, we generally encompass the re-established republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia into the term 'the Baltics'. Historically, though, 'the Baltics' is a fairly new and a rather hollow concept.

In any case, the 'Baltics' cannot be described in a vacuum. To be put in perspective, relief and substance, they have to be compared to some known entity. If we consider 'the Baltics' together with their geographically closest integrated region, 'the North/Nordics/Norden'³, we find almost total incongruity.⁴ The Nordics concept has evolved from grassroot levels, through truly democratic and representative institutions, during a period of at least 150 years. Foreign conquerors and rulers from the 13th century have, as we shall see, defined the concept of 'the Baltics' on.

Among the foreign definitions, from the 13th century on, we can discern a rather vague Papal concept 'Terra Mariae/Marienland' for the heavily crusaded and conquered territories of Livs, Kurs, Latvians and Estonians. On the secular side, the German collective '(Alt-) Livland/Livonia', beside the province 'Livland/Livonia', also contained the Danish duchy of Estland/Estonia (1227-1346), but not the coastal province of 'Kurland/Curonia', for more than 300 years, until the 1560's. Then, in the 17th century, the Swedish invention 'Östersjöprovinserna', included their 'Estland', 'Livland' and, suddenly, 'Ingermanland', south of the river Neva; 'Kurland' being then a well-developed duchy under the Polish crown. In 1795 the Russians added 'Kurland' to their previously (1721) conquered provinces 'Estland' and 'Livland'.

First in the 19th century, the adjective 'Baltic-Germans/Deutschbalte', resp. 'Baltic/baltisch' emerged as a strictly German-speaking regional upper-class distinction. Its purpose was to recognize and exclude the ruling elite (0,5 % of the overall population) from the mass of the native underclass,

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i.e. the 'rurals/Grauen/maarahvas', then mainly of Latvian and Estonian descent. In the 20th century, at the end of World War I, German reactionary forces in 1918 tried to forge a German duchy, 'Baltisches Herzogtum', consisting of the classical Baltic-German-dominated 'Ostseelande', i.e. 'Livland', 'Estland' and 'Kurland',⁵ under the German Kaiser Wilhelm II. In the early 1920's, the newly established republics of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and, very suddenly now, Lithuania, and also Poland, were supposed to make up the new international abstraction, the 'Baltic states'. They should form the northern link of the anti-Bolshevik 'cordon sanitaire', which reached down to the Black Sea. But Finland soon found it politically more profitable to turn westwards, to 'the North/Norden'. At the same time, the Poles got into endemic trouble over Vilnius and adjacent areas with their centuries-old Lithuanian neighbours and partners. Consequently they withdrew from closer 'Baltic' co-operation and left the three 'Baltic states' to care for themselves and, possibly, also for each other.

During World War II, Nazi-German occupants implementing their infamous 'Generalplan Ost' came up with the new normative entity 'Reichkommissariat Ostland', 1941-45, including the aforementioned 'Baltic' republics, and - Belarus⁶. The following Soviet occupation, 1944-91, introduced and secured almost permanently in Russian minds, such classifications like 'Baltijskij Rus', 'Nash Zapad' and, from the Kremlin formal, administrative point of view, 'Sovietskaya Pribaltika', which included also - Kaliningrad oblast' around historical Königsberg and Pillau/Baltijsk. This area also made up their 'Baltic Military District'.

Consequently, the collective names and concepts of the 'Baltic' region have varied with the resp. foreign conquerors. However, universally included in these names seem to be the territories of Estonians, Livs, Kurs and Latvians, i.e. classical Livland, Estland, Kurland. Contrary to them, which should be noted, Lithuania's political and cultural links have been mainly 'Middle East European/ostmitteleuropäisch', even East- and Southeast- bound, down to the Black Sea-area. Lithuania's history, for strictly geopolitical reasons, has been largely tied to Polish concerns. For these same reasons, its future security-policy direction will no doubt continue to be more of a 'Polish business'.⁷ Or, as good Lithuanians tend to see it, vice versa.

Another common denominator is the indisputable fact, that the aforementioned collective geographical and political classifications were ascribed to subdued 'Baltic' tribes and peoples from outside the region and from abroad. This serves as the main distinction to the peaceful inter-Nordic century-and-half-long grassroot-level integrative movement. Evidently, one can expect that non-existent, if not strained or even hostile relations between foreign lords and the mass of native subordinates in the 'Baltics', have contributed negatively to the overall ability to 'defend' the region.

- But how about the independence of the 1920's and 30's, as there were no formal lords, nor subordinates, and the 'Baltic' peoples ruled themselves according to the nations-promoting principles of the 1919 Versailles Conference? How about 'Baltic' co-operation then, especially in the fields of foreign policy and military defence? Surely, Estonia and Latvia then possessed a hard core of battle-experienced officers and soldiers?

- Yes, they did. But, simply put, after the victorious battle of Wenden/Cesis/Võnnu in June 1919, where Estonian and Latvian units crushed the Baltic-German 'Landeswehr' and the 'Reichs'-German 'Eiserne Division' (no prisoners taken!)⁸, time was very short. The lives of millions of citizens of the emerging 'Baltic states' had to be re-organised from scratch and turned westwards, that is, away from the initially chaotic and consequently threatening Soviet Union. In so doing, there

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was, as we have seen, no trilateral tradition at all to build on. Also, the disastrous regional effects of the 1929 global economic crisis had to be overcome in all three republics. Therefore, in terms of 'Baltic' co-operation too little was done too late, in the face of obvious revanchist rearmament in both East and West in the 1930's. As with all the joint 'Baltic' diplomatic and military mobilisation and operative plans, such as the so-called 'Baltic Entente' 1934, 'Baltic' trilateral foreign policy conferences and treaties remained just plans.⁹

The Latvian-Estonian military intelligence makes an exception to this co-operative failure. Without any formal bilateral political agreements, the intelligence sections in the respective General Staffs worked professionally and continuously exchanged vital information on common interest, namely on Soviet and Komintern whereabouts. Similarly, the Estonian and Finnish General Staffs, without political sanctions, i.e. on more or less bona fide or purely collegial basis, jointly planned to close the Finnish Gulf in case of war.¹⁰ The 'Baltic' military of the 1920's and 30's, therefore, should be seen as 'Baltic' co-operative forerunners.

As we know from history, the overoptimistic Estonian and Latvian so-called British political orientation of the 1920's faded away as democracy failed in the second part of the 1920's in Lithuania and some ten years later in Latvia and Estonia. It should be noted, that it were the autocratic Kaunas, Riga and Tallinn decision-makers and their camarillas who gave in to Soviet military pressure in the fateful autumn of 1939, and in the summer of 1940, not the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian nations as such. Therefore, the citizens cannot be blamed for not resisting the Soviet rape, and for not defending themselves¹¹, like the democratically governed Finns did in their heroic Winter War 1939-40.

Times change. New ideas emerge. Good old ones are reworked. As a programmatic contrast to this overall 'Baltic' ineptness some 60 years earlier, the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian ministers of defence, in Tallinn on 24th of February 1993, proclaimed the renewed Baltic defence co-operation. They did it on a wide democratic basis. The new co-operation was to be implemented step-by-step from platoon-level upwards, not primarily for boosting common Baltic military defence, but first of all to form a 'Baltic' well-trained unit for international peace-keeping purposes. Other steps were to follow; as they also did.

'Defence', the international context

Today, when discussing 'national defence', every self-respecting analyst deals with both 'hard' and 'soft' and, additionally, many other strategic issues. At the same time, superficial Western politicians and journalists visiting the 'Baltic states' all too often revert to their, rhetorical question: - 'Baltic defence? Whatever for? How on earth could these countries be defendable? As it seems, they imagine three tiny nations on small territories being exposed to the possible concentrated wrath of a big, strong and aggressive neighbour.

But our sceptical friends, for some reason, never ask if Finland, with its much longer eastern border, far smaller population and with about the same strategic depth, could be defended. Our sceptics seem to regard this as self-evident. Finland has indeed 'created a credible independent defence capability, which enjoys international confidence'.¹² In their somewhat limited fancy the sceptics also omit the constructive factor of time, the encompassing problem complexes in the present all-European, or even global security context, as well as the acting principles of today's international, strongly interwoven security communities.

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Usually, the counter-question: - 'Was totally surrounded West Berlin defensible during the Cold War?' shakes them a little as they gradually start to understand the complexity of the hint. - Of course, from a purely military point of view, Berlin was not defensible. But the otherwise aggressive Warsaw Pact did not dare to test the case. Our Western politicians and journalists know this. Because WAPA's leading politicians and generals recognised, that if attacking, they would be vulnerably hit elsewhere. Accordingly, Western credible deterrence boosted the independence and thereby also the 'defence' of West Berlin. This is a good principal lesson for students and actors in present 'Baltic defence' matters; it is a good lesson for Western benevolent politicians and journalists as well.

On the other hand, one could imagine that, for example, the Latvian national goal in some cases, like nuclear-deterrence, is not set for ultimate military defence of every inch of Latvian territory, but for possibly smooth survival of the nation. Then even surrender to the least of all evils might be the most adequate 'defence'-decision to take.

This is all to say, that the semantics of the abstract substantive 'defence' are depending on its historical contents but also on national aims and objectives. Nevertheless, because of the 'Baltic' definition and context from the 13th century onwards, as referred to above, there has always been and still is clearly more substance in the sentence 'The Baltics can be defended' than in 'The Baltics can defend themselves'.

In fact, 'Baltic' defence has almost always had an international character. It has always been embedded in international political and military enterprise. Confer for instance the undertakings of the veritable war machine of the region in the Middle Ages, the Livonian Order. Its Master residing mainly in Wenden/Cesis or in Riga, took orders from the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order in Marienberg in Prussia, indirectly and occasionally even from the Pope in Rome (as 1242). The Poles and Swedes, fending off Muscovyte Russian troops in 'the Baltics' in the 16th and 17th centuries until 1710, took orders from Warsaw resp. Stockholm, the Swedes in fact were allies of the 'infidel' Turks, south of Russia, as the Russians were allied with the Danes, south of Sweden. These multifaceted clashes of interest occurred during some 60 years in 'the Baltics' (1558-1629) and devastated the Estonian and Latvian lands as well as their peasant populations.

Some 300 years later, the German Imperial army tried to repel the Bolshevik advances in Estonia and Latvia in late 1918. And Hitler's multi-national invasion forces, after they had to abandon their Leningrad blockade in January 1944, carried through heavy and vigorous defensive operations West of Narva until August 1944. In both cases, general instructions and orders were given from Berlin.

On occasions, 'Baltic' territory has been used to launch Western attacks eastwards, like 1242 (the Livonian Order), the beginning of the 17th and 18th centuries (the Swedes, Gustavus II Adolphus and Charles XII), the beginning of the 19th (Napoleon and his 'Grande Armée'), 1919 (general Judenich on Petrograd), 1941 (the Germans with their Operation Barbarossa).

It should be recognised that all these actions were ordered from abroad and above and could in no way, neither formally nor in praxis, represent the wishes of the native population. By the way, the Estonian army disarmed General Judenich's White Russian North-Western Army in late 1919.

Similarly, Russian attacks on the West from 'Baltic' territories and aquatoria could not be considered as having the support of the 'Baltic' peoples. Many such examples exist, such as the assaults against the Swedish East coast in 1719-20, followed by the 1808 invasion on the Swedish island of Gotland and the offensive building of Fort Bomarsund on the Åland islands¹³ just before the Crimean War in the 1850's.

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In 1939-40, during the Finnish Winter War, Soviet strategic air force, based in enforced military bases on the northern coast of Estonia, bombed Helsinki and other Finnish cities.

Finally, from the 1950's and onwards the Soviets threatened their Western neighbours across their Baltic 'Sea of Peace'. Both with nuclear arms, carried by submarines based mainly in the former Königsberg area and by strategic aircraft from all over their 'Sovietskaya Pribaltika', and above all by their SS1c (Scud), SS 12's (Scaleboard), SS 20's and whatever, from well-spread and -masked bunkers in 'Baltic' soil. The portée of the latter reached not only neutral Sweden but also even the Western coast of Norway.¹⁴ So the WP super-joint-manoeuvre 'Západ' in 1981 in the Baltic Sea, starting also from 'Baltic' air and naval bases, involved some 100.000 troops and practised mass transport and large-scale joint landing operations on an open coast. A Swedish parliamentary investigation in 1983 recognised 'to an overwhelming degree' Soviet submarines as regular intruders in Swedish coastal waters.¹⁵

No wonder that at the same time, the 'Baltics', the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian SSRs, as parts of hostile territory i.e., were massively threatened by US and NATO retaliatory missiles.¹⁶ As usual, presumable attacks on, as well as the defence of 'the Baltics' were planned to be carried out by 'non-Baltics'. With whom should the 7-8 millions of 'Balts' unite in solidarity? In face of double destruction? Where should they turn to for safety? The historical thesis, that 'Baltic defence' was, and is, an international matter was some ten-fifteen years ago getting close to Armageddon.

Conclusion

Except for maybe two short periods in history, 'Baltic' defence has been an obvious supra-'Baltic' and international matter. The first exception was the beginning of the 13th century, as Germans, Danes, Swedes and Russians, and even Lithuanians invaded Livonian, Latvian and Estonian lands. The second one in 1918-20, as Estonians and Latvians fought for their national independence against Bolshevik Red Guards, Baltic-German 'Landeswehr' and Russian Whites. It follows that these violated territories were far too often misused for foreign military undertakings against the East as well as against the West. Equally, international conflicts like the Great Northern War (1700-21), World War I and II, were partly carried out in Estonia, Livonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

From the 13th century on, even the collective names of our geographically fluctuating 'region', like 'Livland', 'östersjöprovinserna', 'Reichskommissariat Ostland, or for that matter 'Sovietskaya Pribaltika', have had nothing to do with the wishes, not to mention the ideals and dreams of the indigenous peoples. Nor did these foreign kings, Ordensmeisters, Kaisers, tsars and dictators that followed as formal rulers, ever consider the idea of asking the subdued Livs, Latvians and Estonians et alii about their political or strategic preferences. Clearly¹⁷ there was negligible concern for the oppressed, whether or not coercive Baltic Germans routed invading Poles in their lands, or whether attacking Russians beat or got beaten by some Swedish overlords. Or, for that matter, if they in the 1980's were to be brought to Apocalypse by NATO or WP nuclear missiles. Indeed, 'Baltic defence' has generally not been a 'Baltic' affair - the powerful Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the Middle Ages being a totally different matter.

Only in the independent 1920's and 30's, and after 1994, when the Russian troops finally left the re-established republics of Latvia and Estonia¹⁸, there has been a theoretical chance for a joint 'Baltic defence' on a democratic all-'Baltic' basis. For different practical reasons, a functioning common defence was not established during the first period of independence. The two decisive negative

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reasons for this were a century long tradition for living beside each other rather than together, on one hand. And the fact that governments in the end of the 1930's were constituted by autocratic regimes without much sense of reality on the other. As a result, there was neither 'Baltic' deterrence, nor a functioning collective security system to stop shrewdly operating Stalin and Molotov in 1939/40, Hitler and Himmler in 1941, and Stalin again from 1944 onwards. As we know, the autocratic leaders of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the late 30's gave in one by one. And so their split countries, with their useful ice-free transit harbours¹⁹ from Paldiski/Baltischport at the Gulf of Finland to Ventspils/Windau in south-western Kurland, were picked one by one by the aggressors.

As a contrast to this submissive autocratic behaviour in Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius, the democratically governed Finns resisted the Soviets in 1939. And they eventually succeeded in saving their independence, in reorganising their society and politics, in developing their economy, culture, popular image all over the world, and - also in building an adequate and flexible national defence.

In sum, if neighbourly 'Norden/the Nordics' is to be taken as a model for a thoroughly, and during some 15 decades democratically integrated region, there can hardly be any talk about any 'Baltics' in the same integrated semantic or geopolitical sense. The partly propagandistic notion 'the Baltics' simply carries along far too much of historical and present insignificance. There never has existed any noteworthy feeling of a 'Baltic identity' anywhere - except in some exile centres like the Pinneberg University outside Hamburg in the late 1940's, in Stockholm, New York and Toronto, during the ad hoc 'Baltic Peace and Freedom Cruise' in the Baltic Sea in 1985, and of course in Soviet GULAG prison camps²⁰.

Outlook

Now, in the end of the 1990's, democratic Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have got a new opportunity for co-operation in all fields of social activities. Nothing could really stop them from reaching the monolithic and certainly deterrent defence status of Finland - if they only wanted to. For instance, if they merely decided, they could co-operate in foreign policy and put their border guards, their military and their Nordic-inspired total defence systems under a joint command - to work actively for common protective purposes. Who could actually hinder them? But no Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian political party has, for obvious domestic political reasons dared to come out with such a rational proposal.

However, all 'Baltic' defence of today, regardless of purpose or nature, starts and develops within the republics of themselves. It is conditioned by factors like tradition, mentality, leadership, politics, economy, communications, technology and - the military in each respective country. The Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian military co-operate fairly well, cf. Western-inspired and -supported BALTBAT, BALTRON, BALTNET and BALTDEFCOL, the planned BALTPERSON and BALTWING, and also the new Danish-German-Polish MNC-NE²¹ with its large Baltic Sea area co-operation²². But even so, this is far from enough in times of civilian-led politics. If the parliaments and governments of the 'Baltic' states do not show more understanding and competence for common 'Baltic' vital security and strategy problems, then regardless of massive Western support, because of indubitable geopolitical consequences, the independence of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, will sooner or later be jeopardised. This already seems to be the case with heavily pushed around Latvia. But if Latvia drops away between Estonia and Lithuania - Estonia trying to move in the direction of Finland and Sweden, as Lithuania concentrates on co-operation with its old partner

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Poland - it will only be a matter of time before Russian/CIS still valid so-called Karaganov- or Kozyrev- doctrine²³ will be implemented in the 'Baltics'.

Certainly, a democratic, prosperous and peaceful Russia would be a very nice idea, not least for the Russians. Their main questions seem to be the future identity of Russia and in what direction it will move. Will it remain essentially colonialist, expansive and imperialistic, as the historian Kliutchevskij identified and predicted?²⁴ Or would it keep striving primarily for 'national safety and security', as existentialist philosopher Berdjaiev put it?²⁵ Or will it again grasp for harbours, mining areas and other economic advantages along a (post-)marxist-communist pattern?²⁶ Or, will it even implode and break up into several Russian-speaking states?²⁷ - What then? A new 'smuta'? With all the thousands post-Soviet nukes around?²⁸

Whatever, Russia's ant-size Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian neighbours are confronted with foggy to scary Russian/CIS perspectives on a daily basis. For tangible regional security purposes they should, ideally, try to join forces, politically, economically and militarily - in order to step-by-step catch up with the Finnish monolithic defence model.

No doubt, during the present independence, it is not the ideas of some autocratic leaders, but the free will of Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian citizens will be decisive for their future. That they could succeed in defending themselves, if they really wanted to, is transparently shown by the successful case of Estonia in 1918-20. Some 100.000 men were then mobilised, i.e. about 1/10 of the population. And tens of thousands of young Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians fought bravely during World War II. Unfortunately they had to do so in foreign uniforms, partly on foreign soil, partly even against each other.²⁹ For instance, the battle of Tehumardi on Oct. 8 1944 on southern Oesel/Saaremaa, belong to the really tragic moments of World War II. There the mobilised Estonians in Red Army and in German SS uniforms were forced to slit each other's throats in a pitched night battle. Whereas the Estonians had nothing to do with the start of the war, both totalitarians did.

Such endeavours and sufferings, and the still living ideological heritage of the Estonian, Latvian and especially the Lithuanian 'forest brethren' far into the 1950's, provide a healthy ground for a renewed, defiant will of defence. The impressive 'Baltic Chain' nurtured this hope in critical August 1989. Hundreds of thousands of people then held hands in a peaceful and dignified human chain from Tallinn via Riga to Vilnius.

Looking closer into matters, it should be noted though, that even 1918-20, the Estonian cause was supported diplomatically by a powerful allied mission, and militarily by the British Royal Navy in the Gulf of Finland, by two Finnish effective infantry battalions and by a company of Danish volunteers.³⁰ Accordingly, Estonian/'Baltic' defence even then had international character.

In the future, Western international security systems like the UN, the OSCE, the PfP within the NATO framework, eventually the WEU of the EU, and maybe sometime even still faraway NATO itself, will provide the guarantee for the freedom of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. But on one simple condition: The peoples, the politicians and military of these republics must show an outspoken will to engage, work and spend what is needed for at least a modern embryo of the total defence of their newly regained independence. On the military side of things, they should be expected at least to be able to respond adequately to all possible conventional 'Operation Returns'³¹ from the Pskov area. The rest would then be the matter for diplomats and the international security community to settle.

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Finally, as we have seen in history, and as will be the case tomorrow mainly as a function of fluctuating and unpredictable Russian politics, 'the Baltics' will remain a thoroughly international matter. For decades already, international observers like recently Carl Bildt of Sweden,³² have regarded 'the Baltics' as a barometer of Russian foreign politics. Even the traditionally soft-spoken Finns engage in placing 'the independence of the Baltic countries on a stable footing in recognising these countries security concerns'. They explicitly state that 'there must be no security vacuum in the Baltic countries'.³³

Ergo: the future 'Baltic defence' will be partly national, partly hopefully also inter-'Baltic' and monolithic as our Finnish model. Plus - depending on the local and regional efforts - it will as always be either Eastern, or it will be Western. On the threshold of the Third Millennium AD, it is high time for the Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians to practically prove where they belong.

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¹ Generally 800-1050 A.D. Or, to be more quasi-precise, 793-1066.

² Notably, from the West, the Scandinavians, i.e. Swedes, Gotlanders and Norsemen - for instance, according to the ancient Norse 'Saga Olaf Tryggvassonar', the later legendary Norwegian king Olaf Tryggvasson (†1000) was kept for years as a slave on the island of Oesel/Saaremaa) - and then from the East the Russians and their vassals of the then independent city-states of Pskov and Novgorod. But, of course, as we can read in detail in the 13th century Chronicle by Henry of Livonia, Lithuanian, Latvian, Livonian, Curonian and Estonian tribes in ancient times, on occasion, also raided, cooperated and fought each other.

³ Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, i.e.

⁴ For a more detailed analysis, cf. H.Rebas, Baltic Cooperation - Problem or Opportunity? In: Perspectives. Institute of International Relations, Prague, Nr 9. Winter 97/98, p.67-76.

⁵ Cf. for instance, the title of the standard work by R.Wittram, *Baltische Geschichte 1180-1918. Die Ostseelände Livland, Estland, Kurland*. München 1954.

⁶ until 1944, to be exact, as for 'partisan-ridden' Belarus.

⁷ formally from 1386 until 1772 as Russia swallowed its first of three 'Polish' gulps.

⁸ cf. lately H.Walter, *Landeswehri sõjast...Ausalt ja avameelselt*. Tallinn 1989.

⁹ Cf. for an overview, G.von Rauch, *Geschichte der baltischen Staaten*. DTV. Wissenschaftliche Reihe, 2. Aufl., München 1977 ; Idem, *The Baltic States: The Years of Independence*. London, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1974; For a detailed analysis of the trilateral problems, cf. H.Rebas, *Baltic Regionalism?* In: Regional Identity under Soviet rule: The Case of the Baltic States. Hackettstown. New Jersey 1990, p. 413-28.

¹⁰ Cf. J. Leskinen, *Vaiettu Suomen silta*. Helsinki 1997; This is evidently not the place to discuss if these joint actions might have been in the German OKW interests as well.

¹¹ On the other hand, the citizens of the three Baltic states seem to have had the political leaders they deserved.

¹² *Security in a Changing World. Guidelines for Finland's Security Policy*. Report by the Council of State (1995), p. 43.

¹³ belonging to the then Grand Duchy of Finland.

¹⁴ R.Taagepera, *Inclusion of the Baltic Republics in the Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone*. In: Journal of Baltic Studies XVI/1, Spring 1985, AABS, p. 33-51; Cf. also L.Uller, *The Nordic Reach of Soviet Forces in the Leningrad and Baltic Military Districts*, and B.Hugemark, *The Significance of Soviet Forces in the Baltic for Swedish Security*. Both in: Journal of Baltic Studies, XVII/3, Fall 1986, p. 220-37.

¹⁵ *Att möta ubåtshotet. Ubåtskränkningarna och svensk säkerhetspolitik*. SOU 1983:13. Stockholm, esp. p. 80.

¹⁶ G.L.Guertner, *Nuclear Strategy in the Nordic Region*. In: Journal of Baltic Studies XVI/1, Spring 1985. p. 6-17.

¹⁷ Here, subjective and openly propagandistic concern is omitted on purpose.

¹⁸ They had left Lithuania earlier.

¹⁹ Cf. Molotov's explicite speech on August 1, 1940, in Moscow, on the VI. Meeting of the Supreme Soviet, as the fresh 'Baltic SSRs' 'opted' for membership in the friendly family of USSR nations. In: Pravda (Moscow), Aug.6. 1940.

²⁰ H.Rebas, *Balti koostöö - probleem või võimalus?* In: Akadeemia 9/1998. Tartu, p. 1795-1814, esp. p. 1808-10, with commentaries by A. Kaalep and J.Isotamm; cf also A.I.Solzhenitsyn's world-famous 'Ivan Denissovich' and his 'GULAG-Archipelago'.

²¹ Multi-National Corps North-East, earlier LANDJUT with HQ in Rendsburg, as of April 99 with HQ in Szczecin/Stettin.

²² within NATO Partnership for Peace operations framework.

²³ From 1992, with the ominous notion of Russia's 'Near Abroad', i.e. former Soviet territories, where Russia pretends to have 'special obligations' to their fellow countrymen.

²⁴ V.O.Kliutchevskij, (1841-1911), whose 'Kurs Russkoj Istorii' in five volumes (1904-10) and many editions moulded Russian minds for decades.

²⁵ N.A.Berdjaiev, (1874-1948), exiled 1922, in 'Sudba Rossii...', Moscow 1918.

²⁶ Cf. Molotov 1940, as in footnote 18.

²⁷ Cf. S.Hedlund, *Hur många Ryssland efter Sovjet?*. Stockholm 1993.

²⁸ Cf. openly 'derzhava'/revanchist A. Drugin, Osnovy geopolitiki. Geopoliticheskoye budyushtcheye Rossii. Arktogeya. Moskva 1997. The author's (pseudonyme?) special consultant is Lieutenant Genral N.P. Klokotov, Head of the Strategic Institute of Russian General Staff Military Academy; And, as late as Dec. 1998, Russia/CIS's Minister of Defence, General Igor Sergeyev, visiting China's National Defence Academy, threatened: 'Chechnya, or some other region that wants to secede from Russia, but also Estonia, Latvia, Japan and other countries with unsolved territory problems with the Russian Federation, could become potential targets for nuclear attack', as quoted by Tatyana Jurassova of Moscow in Tallinn weekly 'Den za Dnyom'. T. Kallas, Kes vehib tuumapommiga? In: Postimees (Tartu), 9.12.1998.

²⁹ Mainly in German, Soviet and Finnish units.

³⁰ A Swedish voluntary corps turned out to be more of a quantité négligeable.

³¹ as of August 1998 as the reinforced 76. Guard Airborne Division in Pskov mobilised and moved westwards.

³² Conservative Prime Minister of Sweden 1991-94.

³³ Security in a Changing World. Guidelines for Finland's Security Policy. Report by Council of State (1995), p- 49.